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ABSTRACT
WRITING AGAINST THE ETHOS OF INDIVIDUALISM: A STUDY IN
CONTEMPORARY MULTIETHNIC AMERICAN FICTION
Manahari Adhikari, Ph.D.
Department of English
Northern Illinois University, 2015
David Gorman, Director
Drawing from existential philosophy, neuroscience, and social psychology, in
Writing Against the Ethos of Individualism: A Study in Contemporary Multiethnic
American Fiction, I investigate the representation of the self in fictions by Bharati
Mukherjee, Leslie Marmon Silko, Maxine Hong Kingston, Sandra Cisneros, and Toni
Morrison. I argue that these writers imagine the lives of their fictional characters in terms
of the phenomenology of existence and reveal how subjective experiences and personal
relationships influence who these characters are and who they become. In imagining a
self’s authentic ontology in relation to others, multiethnic writers not only write against
the dominant narratives of our time that posit each individual as an end in itself but also
put into question Martin Heidegger’s view of authentic existence. In addition, they make
a strong case for a change in the individualistic ethical principles of the West to a more
humane paradigm, which in Native American philosopher V. F. Cordova’s words is “a
recognition of the We-factor.”
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INTRODUCTION: SELF AND AUTHENTICITY
What I constantly aim at across my experiences
are the Other’s feelings, the Other’s ideas, the
Other’s volitions, the Other’s character. This is
because the Other is not only the one whom I see
but the one who sees me.
--Jean-Paul Sartre
Man is not a solitary animal, and as long as social
life survives, self-realization cannot be the
supreme principle of ethics.
--Bertrand Russell

This dissertation is an inquiry into the representation of the self in contemporary
multiethnic American fictions by Sandra Cisneros, Toni Morrison, Maxine Hong
Kingston, Bharati Mukherjee, and Leslie Marmon Silko. It examines the way in which
these writers situate their fictional characters within an existential context and reveal
lived reality as the constitutive of individual ontology. What figures large in their
phenomenological accounts of the self are the dialectics of personal will and
interdependence and of freedom and submission to the dictates of the actuality of
existence.1 In multiethnic fictions, authentic identity is contingent upon the social and
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In Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives, Thomas Hylland Eriksen
says that it was during the Second World War that “ethnicity” came to be used as a
“polite term referring to Jews, Italians, Irish and other people considered inferior to the
dominant group of largely British descent” (4). But, in the 1960s, social anthropologists
began to use the term to explain the “classification of people and group relationship.” In
everyday language “ethnic” is associated with “‘minority issues’ and ‘race relations,’ but
in social anthropology it refers to aspects of relationships between groups which consider
themselves, and are regarded by others, as being culturally distinctive.” According to
Erikson, “Although it is true that ‘the discourse concerning ethnicity tends to concern
itself with substantial units, or minorities of some kind or another,’ majorities and
dominant peoples are no less ‘ethnic’ than minorities” (5). Taking a cue from this, I use
ethnic to refer to writers who belong to the dominant as well as the minority cultural
groups. Insofar as we define ourselves in terms of the cultural group we belong to, it is
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cultural circumstances the self is born into which influence, if not determine, individual
emotions and behavior, rather than the self alone as the sole reality against which to judge
its ability to realize its true potential.2 In addition, while the individualistic ideology of
the Anglo-American tradition defines the self as an autonomous entity that finds its own
way according to standards that it sets for itself, as if its authentic possibilities are
inherent within itself, multiethnic writers question such conceptualization as an
inadequate account of the self’s existential nature.3
In The Bluest Eye, Toni Morrison provides us with a deep insight into the extent to
which others’ perceptions shape individual lives in her portrayal of the novel’s
protagonist, Pecola Breedlove, who descends into madness in absence of an emotional
anchor.4 While her emotional-wellbeing is dependent upon her bonds with parents and

problematic to apply ethnic to some but not others. To call a community ethnic is to give
birth to non-ethnic other, which leads to a construction of what Derrida would call a
violent hierarchy of an ethnic versus non-ethnic. The creation of such binary might
promote prejudices as it leaves room for prioritizing one term over the other. Since we
share a similarity of values of the community we come from and have a strong sense of
attachment, no one is less ethnic than the other. We are all ethnics. It is also important to
mention here that the idea that multiethnic writers theorize self in terms of its existential
reality applies to all literatures of the United States, but given the scope of this
dissertation, I limit my analysis to five major writers who represent four ethnic groups:
Asian American, African American, Hispanic American, and Native American.
2

Existential reality refers to the world into which we are born and from which we cannot
escape.

3

While Heideggerian and individualistic ideology conceive authenticity in terms of
individual situation and emphasize self-sufficiency and self-reliance as the sources of an
authentic ontology, multiethnic writers depict the self as a relational entity and locate the
sources of an authentic selfhood in the real of social relationships.

4	
  Hereafter,

I will refer to The Bluest Eye as Bluest, The House on Mango Street as
Mango Street, and The Woman Warrior as Warrior.
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the members of her community, they never look after her emotional needs, and instead
ignore her even when she is sexually abused. Worse, values, attitudes, and assumptions
prevalent in the society disrupt her perception and cause negative self-awareness. Isolated
both in family and her community and exposed to the dominant discourse on beauty that
causes anxiety about her appearance, Pecola begins to feel discontent with her own
image. This experience not only destroys her sense of self but also thwarts her personal
development, eventually leading into insanity, an inauthentic mode of being.
Like Morrison, Leslie Marmon Silko inquires into the depth and dimension to
which others serve as ontological structures for the self to have existential significance in
Ceremony through her depiction of the novel’s protagonist Tayo. At the beginning of the
novel, he suffers from emotional delusion, but he mends his broken self to coherence
when others reaffirm his existence by reaching out to him. Morrison and Silko see shared
reality as the existential basis of the self’s authenticity, which is coterminous with
Shinobu Kitayama and Hazel Markus, who argue that the Western idea of a subject as an
“independent, self-contained, autonomous entity who (a) comprises a unique
configuration of internal attributes (e.g., traits, abilities, motives, and values) and (b)
behaves primarily as a consequence of those attributes . . . is simply not an adequate
description of selfhood” (224-25). Multiethnic account of an authentic ontology as
emerging from the phenomenology of existence is a major shift in recent theorization of
the self, for not only does it offer a more plausible account of the human condition but
also questions the individualistic ethical principles of the Western world.
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Although multiethnic writers view human existence in terms of ordinary life
experiences, reveal the phenomenal basis of being, and recover the existential
significance of others, as we shall see, scholars are virtually silent on these issues. Within
existing multiethnic scholarship, the focus has been on ethnic and cultural matters.
According to Geoffrey Fox, although Latino authors write from diverse cultural
backgrounds and although Latino literature is diverse in range and focus, the “Anglo art
establishment” has been limited to exploring ethnic issues. “No matter how idiosyncratic,
how intensely personal their vision,” Fox laments, Latino “work will be regarded as a
totem of their tribe” (185). Even “Latino intellectuals, especially those in ethnic studies
departments in universities,” encourage ethnic readings, demanding what Fox calls
“totemic readings,” readings that are concerned with cultural traditions and conventions.
Studies involving multiethnic fictions also generally adopt an individualistic approach to
discuss fictional characters, as if they are isolated individuals, while remaining silent on
how the existential significance of others is essential to their development. Referring to
scholars who see her fictional characters as if they are what they make of themselves
while overlooking the influence of community upon their fundamental ontology, in an
interview with Nellie McKay, Morrison says:
I long for a critic who will know what I mean when I say “church” or
“community,” or when I say “ancestor,” or “chores.” Because my books come
out of those things and represent how they function in the black cosmology.
Sula’s return to Medallion can be seen as a defeat for her in the eyes of some
critics, because they assume that the individual, alone and isolated, making his
or her way, is a triumphant being. With black people, her return may be seen as
a triumph and not a defeat, because she comes back to where she was at the
beginning. As much a pariah as she is in that village, she is nevertheless
protected there as she would not be elsewhere. I am yearning for someone to
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see such things—to see what the structures are, what the moorings are, where
the anchors are that support my writings. (425-26)
For Morrison, the self is a part of the community and cannot be understood without
accounting for the ways in which it relates to others. It is inside the fold of the
community that one feels safe and cared for. Indeed, it is hard to grasp the life story of
Sula, the protagonist of the novel Sula, in her own individual situation. To ascribe
meaning to her existence without any reference to her communal base is to divorce her
from her existential reality that is a ground for her being because her identity is built in
and through her community, which provides her shelter, sustains her, and gives her hope.
My intention in this dissertation is not to suggest that cultural or ethnic
approaches are irrelevant, because multiethnic literature does invite and encourage such
readings. In fact, exploring people and their beliefs, customs, and traditions in literatures
of the United States is not only relevant but also necessary. However, if as Fox and
Morrison suggest, we study multiethnic literature only in relation to ethnic or cultural
contexts from which it emerges or adopt individualistic perspectives, we might limit our
ability to understand its thematically complex nature. To move beyond what ethnic,
cultural, or individualistic perspectives would allow us, I use an existential-humanistic
perspective to explore existential issues theorized in Morrison’s Bluest, Silko’s
Ceremony, Cisneros’s Mango Street, Kingston’s Warrior, and Mukherjee’s Jasmine. For
my interpretive framework, I will draw on existential philosophy, contemporary theories
of the self, and recent findings in neuroscience. Multiethnic fictions show a unique
ontological correlation between the self and other and see this relationship as the basis for
an authentic being. The idea that individual possibilities for authenticity are always
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conditioned by the lived context as well as intimate relationships runs counter to the
Western philosophy of individualism and Heideggerian philosophy of being that
vindicate the self as the supreme reality and do not locate the sources of its authentic
ontology beyond its own horizon. I shall begin by recapitulating accounts of the self by
prominent thinkers of the West as a context for subsequent discussion on the
representation of the self in contemporary multiethnic American fictions.
The Question of Self
We believe that much of the thinking about the self of
educated Americans, thinking that has become almost
hegemonic in our universities and much of the middle
class, is based on inadequate social science,
impoverished philosophy, and vacuous theology. There
are truths we do not see when we adopt the language of
radical individualism. We find ourselves not
independently of other people and institutions but
through them. We never get to the bottom of our selves
on our own. We discover who we are face to face and
side by side with others.
--Robert N. Bellah et al.

The debate over the question of self is as old as the Eastern and Western
philosophical traditions. Thinkers from both philosophical traditions have long been
reflecting upon the nature of human existence conceiving it in various ways. Hindu
philosophy conceives the self as the absolute and/or the Supreme that dwells deep inside
each individual. The Bhagavad-Gita characterizes the self as one that “weapons cannot
cleave,/ nor fire burn […],/ water cannot wet him, nor/ wind dry […] away . . . eternal,
all-pervading,/ stable, immovable, ever the same” (102-03). In Western intellectual
tradition, René Descartes was the first to formulate the idea of the self in terms of
mind/body dualism. Descartes writes, “This ‘I,’ that is to say, the soul through which I
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am what I am, is entirely distinct from the body and is even easier to know than the body,
and even if there were no body at all, it would not cease to be all that it is” (19). In his
schema, mind and body inhabit independent spheres of existence. Not only does
Descartes create a mind-body divide, he also discounts senses as deceitful, arguing that
what our senses lead us to imagine and whatever enters into our mind is illusive as our
dreams. For him, “while I wanted thus to think that everything was false, it necessarily
had to be the case that I, who was thinking this, was something . . . I think, therefore I
am” (18). While the self has the ability to doubt things that exist in the external world,
what cannot be doubted is the existence of the entity that does the doubting. From this
perspective, thinking becomes a ground of all grounds for a self’s ontology in that it is
thinking alone that authenticates the existence of the individual who does the thinking.
As if a follower of Hinduism, Descartes describes the soul as indestructible. In his
formulations, “our soul is of a nature entirely independent of the body, and consequently
[. . .] that it is not subject to die with it” (33). This view of the soul, as neither created
from matter nor subject to change and as separate from the body, rules over the social
aspect of being. Moreover, the idea that mind is at the center of our being discredits the
body and denies that the mind is one with, not separate from, it. While Descartes ignores
the self’s corporeal and material reality, thinking involves bodily sensations. Mind is a
part of the human body and bodily experiences such as perceiving and knowing prompt
thinking and influence perception. Bodily sensations and tensions induce certain mental
responses that might manipulate or endanger the ability to concentrate, if not think. Since
the body is the base of our thinking, the mind can neither preside over it as a self-
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functioning realm nor understand the external world without the body. Mind and body are
aspects of the same reality and cannot make their own ontology in isolation.
Calling into question the Cartesian dichotomy of body and mind, contemporary
thinkers such as Michel Foucault conceptualize the self in terms of language, power, and
material reality. In Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison and The History of
Sexuality: The Use of Pleasure Foucault offers a constructivist account of sex, sexuality,
and identity. Foucault conceptualizes “the subject [as] constituted through practices of
subjection, or . . . through practices of liberation, of freedom . . . starting of course from a
certain number of rules, styles and conventions that are found in the culture” (Foucault
Live 313). He argues that the modern subject is an effect of the “technologies of power
[that] determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends or
domination, an objectifying of the subject” (Ethics 225). For Foucault, the self is a
function of what he calls the episteme, the ensemble of rules that govern knowledge of a
given society. In his modality, the “human body enter[s] a machinery of power that
explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it” (Discipline 138). Thus, subjectivity is a
social product and a function of discourse. Discursive practices of an era produce
“subjected and practiced bodies, ‘docile’ bodies.” Since consciousness, as Foucault
suggests, comes into existence out of discursive practices, the Cartesian mind cannot live
above and beyond its materiality, but “merely unveils [itself] to [its] own eyes in the form
of a being who is already, in a necessary subjacent density, in an irreducible anteriority, a
living being, an instrument of production, a vehicle for words which exist before [it]”
(Order 313). Foucauldian theorization of the self as discursively constructed is a seminal
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move away from the Cartesian conceptualization because it puts an end to the
conceptualization of the self as autonomous, ahistorical, and transcendent.
Foucault is not alone in theorizing the self in terms of language and/or socialhistorical reality. Jacques Lacan reconceptualizes human subjectivity as the product of
language, albeit from a post-structural and psychoanalytical perspectives. For Lacan, the
subject is “the effect of the signifier: it is constituted by signifiers” (Four 207). It is
important here to mention that Lacan follows the basic principles of human development
postulated by Sigmund Freud, but he goes beyond Freudian notions of sexual drives and
desires, explaining the emergence of subjectivity in terms of the symbolic system. While
for Freud the unconscious is a consequence of the human body suffering primal
repression, libidinal one, for Lacan it is language that lays foundation for the
unconscious: “unconscious is structured like a language; it is neither being, nor nonbeing, but the unrealized ” (20, 30). Lacan thus speaks of the unconscious, not as a
separate entity filled, as Freud believed, with repressed libidinal desires, but as a
linguistic construct whose constitution is subsequent to the positioning of the child within
the symbolic system. Identity is the function of language. In other words, the condition
for becoming a speaking self entails the child’s induction into language. It is only after
being inserted into the symbolic that the child is awakened to its sense of being. While
signifiers create a condition for speech and articulation, they do not, however, signify
anything except representing the speaking self for other signifiers. Fated to rely on the
semiotic system, which is playful in nature, the self is betrayed for another signifier.
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Lacan writes, the signifiers “merely induce [the self] into the field of the Other.”5 Caught
within the laws of the symbolic, the speaking self submits to the deceptive nature of
signifiers that float perpetually. In Lacanian terms, the “unary signifier represents the
subject for another signifier . . . . Hence the division of the subject—when the subject
appears somewhere as meaning, [it] is manifested elsewhere as ‘fading,’ as
disappearance” (218). This phenomenon of the speaking self succumbing to the playful
nature of signifiers Lacan calls “the fading of the subject” (208).
Coming into being is thus not a biological event but an effect of language. As
Lacan envisages it, subjectivity is a function of the symbolic, but subjected to the limits
of language, the self is left with a sense of inadequacy and ontological rootlessness. A
site of inscription, the self is imprisoned inside the prison house of language where
signifiers move in reference to other signifiers for their lack of the signified, the
fundamental point of their reference. Consequently, the self comes into presence because
of language, but caught up in a system that is not only fictional but also exterior, the
speaking self is continuously restructured. If signifier is the starting point for subjectivity
to come into existence, if language is the locus of the thinking mind, and if the subject is
nothing other than an effect of signifiers that slide perpetually, the ontological purity of
the Cartesian cogito is indefensible. This overview of the many key differences between
philosophers who contemplate the idea of the self will inform my discussion on self’s
authentic and inauthentic existence.
5

Lacan defines the “Other” as the “locus in which is situated the chain of the signifier
that governs whatever may be made present of the subject—it is the field of that living
being in which the subject has to appear” (Four 203).
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Existence: Authentic and Inauthentic
Since this study is an attempt to analyze multiethnic fictions from an existentialhumanistic perspective, I shall turn now to existential philosophy of being. Conception of
the self, as theorized by Martin Heidegger, rests on an assumption of an essential
separation between the “ontic” and the “ontological,” where the former concerns human
entity and the latter its behavioral aspect (Being 34). In Being and Time Heidegger uses
the term “Dasein” to refer to a human entity, where da and the sein correspondingly
signify to “there” and “to be.” Heidegger writes, “This entity which each of us is . . . we
shall denote by the term ‘Dasein’” (27). For him, Dasein is “an entity which is in each
case I myself; its Being is in each case mine” (150). Thus, existing means projecting
oneself and coming into presence: “Dasein exists in the world; in its everydayness, it
comports itself toward [the] world” (32, 149). In an existential sense, the everyday
projection of the self is its visibility as being. From this perspective, a self’s essence lies
in its Being in that “Being in the world is something that belongs essentially” (33).
Heidegger goes so far as to say that for the most part Dasein is in an inauthentic mode of
being because “being is something that has been thrown; it has been brought into its
‘there,’ but not of its own accord” (329).
In Heideggerian account, Dasein discloses itself in two basic modes, authentically
and inauthentically. In its everyday being in the world a self falls away from itself as an
“authentic potentiality for Being its Self” (220). It is so because the self devolves into
forgetful absorption such as idle talk: “The ‘they’ always keep [it] from taking hold of its
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possibilities of Being” (Being 220, 312).6 The source of an authentic self lies in Dasein’s
ability to bring back from its lostness in the world. In this schema, the “they” (das Man)
or the public world cannot be the ground of its ontology. Heidegger is so occupied with
Dasein, especially its private experiences more than its public and social life, that he
negates the body as well as the “they-self,” the public sphere of life, as if the self exists
independent of others.7 His biggest fear is that, in being-with a self can turn away from
itself and lose its potentiality-for-being. Since the world fascinates Dasein, it cannot
defend itself against the temptation to give way to the public world and to retain its
authentic state of being.
Heidegger dreads that others might prevent Dasein from attaining its authentic
potential. In order to discover its authentic being, Dasein must, therefore, “bring back
from its lostness in the ‘they’ [so that] the they-self is modified in an existential manner
so that it becomes authentic Being-one’s-Self” (Being 313). Unless Dasein withdraws
itself from the public world, “I myself am [cannot become] the ‘who’ of Dasein” (312).
Heidegger thus privileges the self as the supreme reality and its private domain as the
locus of its ability to be, as if being what it is is both subjective as well as interior, but not
external and interpersonal. For him, authenticity is realized in terms of the nature of
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Heidegger defines falling as one of the structural aspects of Dasein’s being-in-theworld. Additionally, idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity reveal “a basic kind of Being
which belongs to everydayness; we call this the ‘falling’ of Dasein” (219). In its
everydayness, Dasein is inauthentic because it loses its primordial sense of what it is and
fails to stand by itself (220).
7

Heidegger describes “the ‘They’ . . . [a]s nothing definite, and which all are, though not
as the sum” (164). “They” refers to “those who proximally and for the most part ‘are
there’ in everyday Being-with-one-another.” Thus, “they” is the public world.
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being, the being which is the ontological other to life. In conceptualizing authenticity in
terms of the self becoming singly and uniquely itself, Heidegger rules out the body and
envisages existence separate from it.8 However, such a conception of an authentic self as
involving the self alone is unconvincing, for to say that one’s substance is not body but
existence is to negate the body and to assume being as ontologically prior to and
independent of the body. Without body there is no being.
John Caputo claims that, in Heidegger’s theory of the human being, the “Wesen of
the human body lies outside the organic, in the role it plays in providing a clearing or
opening for Being. . . . Thought of being drives out the philosophy of life” (125-26).
Writing against the excessive focus on the temporality or the unfolding of Dasein, Caputo
claims that Heidegger “decontaminated the body . . . to purify it of anything organic,
biological, non-essential” (124). Almost congruent with Caputo, Jerrold Seigel argues
that “the whole Heideggerian account of Western selfhood is woefully one-sided,
inspired by his idiosyncratic and highly questionable way of setting the self’s dimensions
in relation to each other, all in the service of a search for transcendence” (42). As Caputo
and Seigel suggest, no discussion of the self can overlook the existential significance of
the body. In his search for the timeless and transcendent nature of the being of Dasein,
while Heidegger discards the body and postulates it as independent of and separate from
it as well as from culture and history, without body there would be no being, and a
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Heidegger imagines authentic existence in terms of individual situation and dismisses
the significance of the “they” as an ontological structure of a self’s being. I see the public
world as the source of our capacity to act in the world authentically.
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conceptualization of being devoid of the body would be the being of a non-being or
nothing.
While Heidegger seeks transcendent being, by its mere existence, the self is situated
socially at any point in time and is interlocked in the most basic sense of its factical
comportment with others. Neither can one accord ontological priority to being nor can
one locate the source of an individual self outside and beyond the social realm. In other
words, authenticity is mediated by the self’s ontology which tends not only within but
also outward toward the world. Thus, to explicate the self’s being involves understanding
the worldhood where one unfolds as Dasein including one’s sensuous experiences. To
abstract the self away from the “they” as a self-contained and self-sufficient realm is to
negate the effects of parental investment, attitudes and perceptions of friends and people.
While Heideggerian investigation of Dasein has no regard for the body, the contingent
and the everyday circumstances of lived experience influence its behavior and thereby
being.
If, as Heidegger sees it, the public world impedes the self from realizing its
authentic potential, Merleau-Ponty’s postulations of the self question such position as
untenable. For Merleau-Ponty, the body is a meaningful core and the locus of expressive
movements—movements that cause the body to begin to exist as a thing (169-70). In its
sheer facticity, the ontic cannot be detached of the ontological because the latter is not
outside of it but is inherent within the former. The origin of human behavior, the body
“expresses the total existence not because it is an external accompaniment to that
existence but because existence comes into its own in the body” (166). In other words,
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the body and its being are one. Elaborating on the unity that exists between the ontic and
the ontological, Merleau-Ponty writes, “Habit expresses our power of dilating our beingin-the-world, or changing our existence by appropriating fresh instruments. . . . The
phenomenon of habit prompts us to revise our notion of ‘understand’ and our notion of
the body” (166-67). And the origins of our thinking lie in our understanding of situations
and our responses to those situations, which question the Cartesian and Heideggerian
divide between the body and being.
I would like to emphasize that the human body is an antecedent of its being and
thus the Heideggerian quest for pure being bereft of the body is implausible. Moreover,
our coming to be invites responses from others, responses which are elemental in
determining the state or quality of our life (Merleau-Ponty 166). We modify our behavior
based on the information available to our consciousness, and it is perception that not only
renders this information accessible but also alters our mode of being. Our experiences
and our understanding of situations beget our responses to those situations and shape our
behavioral patterns (164-65). Merleau-Ponty further postulates the existence of each
individual in terms of desires and actions. According to him, “My thoughts and [the
thoughts of others] are interwoven into a single fabric. We have a dual being, where the
other is for me no longer a mere bit of behavior in my transcendental field, nor I in
[other’s]; we are collaborators for each other in consummate reciprocity” (413). Not only
do our experiences with others determine us but also “our perspectives merge into each
other, and we co-exist through a common world.” These reflections on the ontological
ground of existence where the perspectives of the self and others merge into one question
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the Cartesian mind-body dialectic as well as Heideggerian divide between the ontic and
the ontological.
Reminiscent of Merleau-Ponty, Charles Taylor provides a dialectical frame by
which to understand the self. For Taylor, the “genesis of the human mind [is not]
‘monological,’ not something each accomplishes on his or her own, but dialogical”
(Ethics 33). While selfhood is neither subjectively constituted nor is its sources inherently
present in itself, contemporary culture inculcates the idea of developing “our own
opinions, outlook, stance to things, to a considerable degree through solitary reflection.”
In the contemporary era, the essential condition for authenticity is that “I am free when I
decide for myself what concerns me, rather than being shaped by external influences . . . .
There is a certain way of being human that is my way, [ . . .] of ‘doing [my] own thing’
or ‘finding [my] own fulfillment’” (27-29). Although individualistic cultures promote the
idea that the choices the self makes determine what it becomes and conceive authentic
identity as realizable through individual efforts, which calls one to listen to one’s own
“inner” voice, Taylor argues that “this is not how things work with important issues, such
as the definition of our identity” (33). Taylor is right in his observation that a sense of
selfhood springs out of the existential realm in which one is situated for “The general
feature of human life . . . is its fundamentally dialogical character” (32-33).
Taylor laments that with its emphasis on the individual self the individualistic
tradition has narrowed down our vision and made our lives “poorer in meaning” (Ethics
4). If we define our lives in terms of ourselves, the question of authenticity does not even
arise. We lose the purpose of our life. According to Taylor, undue self-interest gives birth
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to a culture where people will tend to pursue solitary life style. For its focus on the
personal, individualistic ethos flattens out the world and makes the “horizons of meaning
. . . fainter.” Self-absorption increases the tendency to withdraw from social life, which
eventually intensifies aloofness and alienation—the malaise of the modern world (69).
Thus, in fear that individualism might lead to a growing social isolation, Taylor says,
“authenticity can’t, shouldn’t, go all the way with self-determining freedom” (69). A part
of our environment, we cannot turn a blind eye to what Taylor calls the “horizons of
significance” (66) and imagine living a fuller, richer, and more complete life in absence
of others. If we exist by and for ourselves, fulfilling our needs and desires, this leads to a
life of “insignificance.” What follows from these observations is that others give meaning
to our life. The sources of authenticity and meaningful existence lie beyond the boundary
of an individual self and involve others. Self/other relational field is determinative of
what a self is, can be, and how life can be lived.
The Relational Self
Individualism is a mature and calm feeling, which disposes
each member of the community to sever himself from the
mass of his fellows and to draw apart with his family and
friends, so that after he has thus formed a little circle of his
own, he willingly leaves society at large to itself. . . .
Individualism, at first, only saps the virtues of public life; but
in the long run it attacks and destroys all others and is at
length absorbed in downright selfishness.
--Alexis de Tocqueville

Taylor is not alone among the theorists of the self who critique the isolating
nature of individualism. More recently, Kenneth J. Gergen theorizes the self in terms of
its relation to the world, providing a far more comprehensive account of it. In his view,
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the idea of the individual is a recent production of the West. Against theorists who
overlook the social structure of being, Gergen defines individual growth in terms of its
interaction with others. He extends the horizons of the self to include others, family and
social circumstances, thus moving away from a Cartesian view of what Leela Gandhi
calls a “subject [that] violently negates material and historical alterity/Otherness in its
narcissistic desire to always see the world in its own self-image” (39). It is important to
note here that, although the idea of the self as ontologically tied to others has affinities
both to Merleau-Ponty and Foucault’s account of the self as an effect of discourses,
Gergen explains it albeit from his own specific perspective of the “relational being.”
In The Relational Being: Beyond Self and Community, Gergen emphasizes human
interaction in the constitution of a self’s ontology. According to Gergen, when we
prioritize the individual self and seek personal satisfaction above anything else, we
diminish the significance of love and connection because it is “individual well-being that
counts” (21). When personal happiness becomes a basic motivational force for coming
into relationship, “every relationship [becomes] a candidate for commodification” (22).
We become interested in relationship only if others can become instruments for our goals
or ignore them if, according to our estimates, they cannot serve our interests. Gergen
laments that people shudder at the thought of long-term relationships as detrimental to
freedom. In our time “a calculus of self-gratification is central to all human action, from
buying beer to choosing a mate.” Gergen is right to point out that in a culture that instills
the ideal to be deeply sensitive to one’s own desire, there is a broad “suspicion of ‘the

19
other’” because people either fear relationships as constraining or seek them only when it
is necessary (18).
According to Gergen, the “much cherished tradition of the individual self carries
with it enormous costs [because it] invites a sense of fundamental separation and
loneliness; encourages narcissism at the expense of relationships” (27). In Gergen’s idea
of the relational self, others acquire unique existential significance, which questions the
isolating individualistic ideology. If people define relationships in terms of fulfilling
personal desire, they “turn both artificial and threatening, and moral demands are
infringements on our autonomy.” The notion that individual self is an independent entity
that makes its way through the world, fulfilling its “private impulses,” gave rise to doubts
about relationships and commitment (23). When people become more concerned with
personal gain it gives birth to a culture where “we question anyone’s right to tell us what
we should or shouldn’t do” (24). While others are taken as more a hindrance to personal
autonomy than help, the self and others are neither separate nor independent, but relative
and interdependent. Emphasizing the degree to which the self and others are
ontologically intertwined, Gergen writes, “Not only are we joined together, but we are
wedded as well to a preceding world of language” (29). This idea of the “constructed
character of bounded being” questions the individualistic ideal of self-invention through
separation (31). Gergen continues: “All that is meaningful to us as human beings derives
from co-action. All those properties once attributed to individual minds are outcomes of
relationships . . . . [R]eason and emotion, for example, are not possessions of individual
minds, but of relations” (31-32). Gergen’s explanation of the self in the context of others
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shifts the study away from an individualistic view of the self towards its sociological
nature.
Since the purpose of this study is to show multiethnic approach to the self is much
more comprehensive than existential and individualistic accounts of it, I will draw from
Eastern and Western philosophy and theories of the self. Putting Martin Heidegger in a
dialogue with contemporary theorists of the self, in Chapter One, I examine Toni
Morrison’s Bluest. I first begin with a brief critical review of existing scholarship on the
novel and then will explain the estranged self of Pecola Breedlove, the protagonist of the
novel, from an existential perspective. I demonstrate how her hopes for intimacy
eventuate into loneliness and her exposure to prevalent discourse on beauty begets a
desire for blue eyes, thus influencing the way she experiences herself, which separates
her from herself. Disavowed and abandoned, Pecola begins to loathe herself and cannot
function as Dasein. Her desire becomes pathological. In the end, she descends into
madness, which is an existential issue in that insanity makes the existing individual
unaware of herself and of the world in which she projects herself as being. The
anonymity of daily existence and the absence of parental love for Pecola means a loss of
the ability to make sense of her experience, which hinders her growth toward a coherent
identity. What we observe in her suggests that potentiality for being is not something
intrinsic to the self but involves the horizon of existence where one Dasein reinforces the
other.
Chapter Two addresses similar issues in Leslie Marmon Silko’s Ceremony, for the
novel too defines authentic existence in the context of living in its portrayal of Tayo, who
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suffers neglect and racism as well as the horror of the Second World War, which
contribute to who he becomes, a broken and deluded man. But when others begin to care
for him and respond to his need for intimacy, they reorient his perceptions of himself and
affirm his existence. His identification with the world through love and trust others show
restore an adequate sense of hope and imbue his existence with meaning. With others’
support and his own emotional investment, he develops the ability to handle strong
emotions. Whereas the novel, as critics argue, reimagines the Pueblo people and its
traditions, it also emphasizes how others provide meaning for individual existence. When
Tayo discovers that he is a part of the world and recognizes that he is accepted and cared
for by others, he regains his integrated awareness, his vision becomes clearer, and he
begins to share his feelings. Thus, existence, as authentic, entails bonding, for the more
connected Tayo is, the more he is rooted ontologically, the easier it is for him to mend his
broken self to coherence.
Chapter Three studies Maxine Hong Kingston’s Warrior and Sandra Cisneros’s
Mango Street to demonstrate how Maxine and Esperanza, the protagonists of the novels,
create a new sense of identity for themselves based on social obligation and community
well-being instead of a self-fulfilling quest. While others influence their personal
experiences, foster their intellectual strength, and guide their lives, their vision about their
community is their own. Just as Maxine in Warrior bases her desires and actions on
others, such as retrieving relatives buried in oblivion and giving them voice, Esperanza in
Mango Street discovers her life in her commitments for others, which is devoting her
intellectual resources to give voice to people in her community who have been silenced
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and marginalized. As others inspire Maxine’s faith in herself, enabling her to make
meaningful choices, so do the people of Mango Street nurture in Esperanza the ability to
think independently and inspire faith in herself. Since others are intrinsic to their psychic
reality, Esperanza and Maxine share a similar vision of life and attribute the ultimate
significance of their lives to the narratives about others, which is defining themselves by
their obligations to others and observing the lives lived by the people of their community
and chronicling them into the system of signification. By defining their lives in terms of
common good, they come to be and to be authentic.
In the final chapter, I discuss Bharati Mukherjee’s Jasmine as a critique of
individualistic ideology. Like Cisneros, Morrison, Silko, and Kingston, Mukherjee
captures the embodied vision of humanity in her portrayal of Jasmine whose struggle for
authenticity involves others. Although she is courageous and has faith in herself, her
trials and triumphs are tangled in existential contexts that extend beyond ethnic, cultural,
and national boundaries. The entire novel bears the marks of the many struggles of
Jasmine who cannot choose for herself when faced with the terror of her existential
reality. When confronted with the contradictions of life, her choices are limited unless
others show compassion for her suffering and serve as moorings to her soul. This state of
being, of failing to act upon the world in absence of others, highlights the limitations of
the individual self while suggesting the ontological significance of others. When in exile,
Jasmine lives a life of uncertainty and is frightened of her future until others protect her
interests and provide sanctuary. She cannot create meaning and structure in her life unless
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she finds strength in bonds with others, often when there isn’t much she can do on her
own in the face of limitations her existentiality places on her.
In the fictions I have chosen, the self and others receive an equal ontological
priority. In other words, individual capacity to unfold as Dasein and grow toward
authenticity is not solely intrinsic to the person but is relative to the nature of existence
and is the function of relationships, which is a major shift in contemporary theorization of
the self in that not only does it recognize others as an ontological necessity, but it also
rejects Heideggerian and individualistic philosophies that overlook the existential
significance of others in their insistence on the uniqueness of the person as its own end,
as representing an inadequate account of the human condition.9

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  
9

In this dissertation, I use the term ontological necessity to refer to the existential
significance of others for the totality of the self’s individual existence. Also, I will use
“Dasein” and “self” interchangeably to refer to the individual self.

CHAPTER ONE
THE SELF THAT IS NOT-AT-HOME: TONI MORRISON’S THE BLUEST EYE
The longstanding and much cherished tradition of the
individual self carries with it enormous costs. . . .
[T]his tradition invites a sense of fundamental
separation and loneliness; encourages narcissism at
the expense of relationships; generates unending
threats to one’s person, and transforms the self into a
marketable commodity.
--Kenneth Gergen
Prosperous and powerful America seems to offer to
its people only the shoddiest values by which to live,
dehumanized conformity to commercial success and
a hardening of the heart to the plight of another.
--Sidney Finkelstein

Toni Morrison’s Bluest is a fictional account of a poor African-American family,
the Breedloves of 1940s Lorain, Ohio, and yet it primarily focuses on their daughter
Pecola Breedlove. Scholarship on the novel has explored a wide variety of issues such as
race, gender, and sexuality. Madonne M. Miner, for example, has examined the novel
from a mythical perspective, focusing on motifs such as rape, madness, and silence.
Drawing structural parallels between Pecola and Philomela, a figure of Greek mythology
who was raped by Tereus and forced into silence behind stone walls, Miner maintains
that “Tereus, following his act of rape, encloses Philomela in silence”; so is Pecola raped
and she is “silent, isolated, insane: [she] cannot escape” (178). While Tereus cut off
Philomela’s tongue to silence her so that she could not make the crime public, Cholly
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“need not cut off Pecola’s tongue or imprison her behind stone walls” because nobody
believes her (180).
As opposed to Miner’s interesting connections between Pecola and the mythical
figure Philomela, Baum has drawn from findings on the causes of alcoholism and its
effects in the lives of the alcoholic’s family. She has argued that alcohol contributes to
Cholly’s rape of Pecola because it frees “his unruly emotions both savage and tender”
(103). Among other Bluest critics, Cynthia Davis traces the source of Pecola’s
psychological dysfunctionality to the “look of white society [which] not only freezes the
black individual . . . as the antithesis of American beauty . . . but also classifies all blacks
as alike, freezing the group” (327). In a society where the “freedom to define is denied,”
the only viable option Davis contends is to emulate dominant cultural values so as to
“collaborate with the Look of the Other” (328).
Adding to the existing scholarship on Bluest, I argue that in her portrayal of Pecola,
who descends into madness in absence of intimate relationships, Morrison reveals the
relational nature of the self. In an existential sense, when Pecola is dislocated from her
ontological base she is robbed of her authentic existence.1 If anonymity of daily existence
begets a sense of alienation, when faced with the beliefs and practices of mainstream
culture that adore outward physical features such as color, she suffers from an inadequate
sense of self. In turn, she begins to self-scrutinize, which not only gives birth to a desire
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  Heidegger

defines “worldhood” [a]s an” ontological concept [that] stands for the
structure of one of the constitutive items of Being-in-the-world” (Being 92). Additionally,
the term represents both the “‘public’ we-world as well as one’s own closest (domestic,
for instance) environment” (93). In addition to the sense in which Heidegger uses it, I use
worldhood to refer to the relational field out of which individual identity arises.
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for blue eyes but also ruptures the mind-body relationship, which eventually leads to
insanity.2
In an interview with Jane S. Bakerman, Morrison observes that “all the time that I
write, I’m writing about love or its absence . . . and about the way in which people can
hurt each other” (60). It is necessary to investigate whether people take care of each other
so as to gain insight into how a lack of emotional intimacy leads to an inauthentic
existence for Pecola. Any such study might begin with an analysis of the family featured
in a passage from the Dick-and-Jane elementary school primer with which Morrison
introduces Bluest:
Here is the house. It is green and white. It has a red door. It is very pretty.
Here is a family. Mother, Father, Dick and Jane live in the green-and-white
house. They are very happy. See Jane. She has a red dress. She wants to play.
Who will play with Jane? See the cat. The kitten will not play. See Mother.
Mother is very nice. Mother, will you play with Jane? Mother laughs. Laugh,
Mother, laugh. See Father. He is big and strong. Father, will you play with
Jane? Father is smiling. Smile, Father, smile. . . . Here is the house it is green
and white it has a red door it is very pretty here is the family mother father
dick and jane live in the green-and-white house they are very happy see jane
she has a red dress. (3-4)
The house and the people who inhabit it are noticeable in the way this excerpt describes
the family environment and personal dispositions of its occupants. The most
distinguishable feature is the focus on the house. What is surprising here is the spatial
organization of signifiers associated with the house and the family members. The house is
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  
2

Heidegger sees the self as the ultimate reality and the sole source of its authentic
ontology. However, I understand that self and others are existential correlates and serve
as an ontological condition for each other’s existence. Hence, authenticity cannot be
understood without understanding the relational nature of the world into which the self is
born.
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“pretty,” a primer status marker in a capitalistic society, as it carries with it echoes of
accumulation and success. What is surprising here is the spatial organization of signifiers
associated with the house and the family members. The textual features subordinate, if
not repress, signifying elements associated with the family in favor of the house by
placing it at the beginning. Thus, the description attributes dominance to the house over
the family members as if they are of secondary importance.
In a hierarchical schema, the house is followed by its residents, who remain merely
as figures represented by it. The contrast between higher and lower prominence given
between objects, the house, and people indicates the value put on property over humans.
The description of the family members is subordinate to the description of the house, as if
it is the ground of beings, people who inhabit it. In other words, the supremacy of the
property overwhelms the identity of the family members. Likewise, the violation of the
grammatical rules: “Here is the house . . . here is the family mother father” has an
interesting thematic effect, for the condensation of the words and the resultant semantic
chaos can be explained as suggestive of isolated individual existence. Although Jane
requests her parents to participate in a game, the Mother “laughs,” while the Father
simply “smiles.” Within a cultural framework that encourages autonomy, the parents’
disposition is understandable. For individualistic ethics promotes individuality,
compartmentalizes people’s mode of being, and constrains personal movement by
creating self-other boundaries.3 These parents do not make themselves available when
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My use of the term “being” follows Heidegger’s explanation of it as an “entity,
everything we talk about, everything we have in view, and everything towards which we
comport ourselves in any way” (Being 26). I use being in the same sense of a
fundamental process whereby things come out of concealment, disclose and be (29).
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Jane needs them. They, so to speak, seem to value distinction over emotional
connectedness, which will probably influence the psychology and behavior of their
daughter. Thus, even the textual features foreshadow people who populate the novel,
mostly the members of the black community, who are disoriented and sidetracked from
core African-American cultural values.
To recall Heidegger here, we do not choose our own existential reality but are
thrown into the world where others “show themselves . . . in their special environmental
Being” (Being 160). Our worldliness is such that our being involves being-with and
being-in-the-world. That is, to be means to be-in-the-world and to be co-present with
others. Heidegger writes, “Dasein’s Being is ‘Being-with’’’ (161). The issue here is that
we cannot choose our life situation nor can we escape from it. Our understanding about
ourselves involves knowing where we are and with whom we are in our everyday life.
What needs careful consideration is to understand where Pecola stands and to examine
the implications of the existential reality for her ability to be. It is difficult to understand
Pecola as Dasein without discussing the familial and social contexts in which she lives. In
the words of the narrator:
The Breedloves did not live in a storefront because they were having
temporary difficulty adjusting to the cutbacks at the plant. They lived there
because they were poor and black. . . . Although their poverty was traditional
and stultifying it was not unique. But their ugliness was unique. . . . [S]ome
mysterious all knowing master had given each one a cloak of ugliness to wear,
and they had each accepted it without question. The master had said, “You are
ugly people.” (Bluest 38-39)
Pecola is a part of a family she did not choose and cannot change or escape from. While
family is the necessary ontological condition, her parents, who translate their financial
hardship into rage against each other, limit her ability to project her being. Also, her
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parents have lost their sense of dignity by accepting the ugliness attributed to them by
“some master.”
Sociologist R. K. Merton points out that American culture inculcates aspirations
among its citizens, but the methods of realizing those aspirations are available to some,
not others. Those who fail to actualize their dream express their anguish through
delinquency and unlawful behavior (235-36). What Merton says can be seen in Cholly. A
good income would provide for their basic needs and minimize his angst, but “they were
having temporary difficulty adjusting to the cutbacks at the plant” (Bluest 38). While the
“dead coal stove” at home has run out of coal, a man who has failed to achieve the
“dream of affluence” (39), Cholly has resorted to drinking on pennies earned from
backbreaking work (40). Moreover, the Breedloves express their financial stress in
hurtful ways, fighting “each other with a darkly brutal formalism” (43). When her parents
fight, her brother Sammy either “cursed . . . or left the house, or threw himself into the
fray” (45). For Pecola there is no one to turn to except wishing that one of her parents
would be killed or resorting to God, begging God to make her disappear. Not only do her
parents deny her intimacy but also instill fear and anxiety in her, which later take the
form of mental disintegration. At issue, here, is the ontically violent world that is neither
loving nor emotionally supportive. Pecola dwells in a dreadful situation.
In the Breedlove family, the existential reality places limitations upon the projection
of being. Pecola’s relationship with her mother is at bare minimum, which invokes the
Heideggerian notion of the deficient mode of being. According to Heidegger, “Leaving
undone, neglecting, renouncing . . . are ways of concern; but these are all deficient
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modes, in which the possibilities of concern are kept to a ‘bare’ minimum” (83). There is
no emotional intimacy between Pecola and her mother. A brief recalling of Pauline’s past
might explain why she is unresponsive and neglectful. According to the narrator, in her
teenage years Pauline lived a sequestered life: “She was the ninth child of eleven children
and lived on a ridge of red Alabama . . . [in] total anonymity. . . . [S]he never felt at home
anywhere, or that she belonged anyplace” (Bluest 110-11). While her parents worked for
rich families, she took care of the house: “She kept the fence in repair, puling the pointed
stakes erect, securing them with bits of wire, collected eggs, swept, cooked, washed, and
minded the two younger children” (112). Suffocating stillness pervaded her childhood
home. Left to the arduous task of taking charge of the house and isolated from the
community, Pauline cultivates a calm and isolated character. For someone as young as
Pauline, the lack of emotional intimacy at home must have meant an end to joy in her
life. By the time she turns fifteen, Pauline has developed a sense of “extreme
melancholy” and started imagining the “death of newborn things, lonely roads, and
strangers” (113)—a sign of emotional disorientation. After her marriage, she moves to
the North, where her husband had dreamed of a new life. He was hopeful that there were
plenty of factory jobs there. But Pauline finds the Northern African-American people
“Dicty-like. No better than whites for meanness. They could make you feel just as nocount” (117). Moving North further intensifies Pauline’s sense of isolation.
In “African and Afro-American Family Structure: A Comparison” Niara
Sudarkasha writes that “regardless of the ‘diverse’ backgrounds of the Africans enslaved
in America . . . there was a commonality in the familial patterns known to them. It was
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this shared social organizational ‘base-line’ that enabled Africans enslaved in America to
create recognizably African patterns where they lived” 4 (52). Black people were linked
to each other through ties of ancestry and kinship. The spirit of bonding and mutual
assistance held them together and helped them cope with the trauma of slavery. Within
these parameters of the African-American family, the Breedloves are an anomaly. As the
preceding discussion demonstrates, Pauline’s mode of being is in sharp contrast to the
ideal of a black mother who was “a sort of umbrella figure, culture bearer, in that
community with not just her children but all children” (Morrison and Stepto 488).
But the idea of the work alone as being emotionally fulfilling has erased Pauline’s
African-American sensibility and eaten away her empathy. She provides little care for her
children and has translated her maternal love into the service of others. As if a foundation
for her identity, “all the meaningfulness of her life was in her work” (128). Pauline is
only, if, and as long as, the Fishers are; her ontology is not based on her own grounds but
those whom she serves. As self-oriented as she is:
Pauline kept this order, this beauty, for herself, a private world, and never
introduced it into her storefront, or to her children. Them she bent toward
respectability, and in so doing taught them fear: fear of being clumsy, fear of
being like their father . . . . Into her son she beat a loud desire to run away, and
into her daughter she beat a fear of growing up, fear of other people, fear of
life. (128)
To Pauline, the Fisher’s home looks like everything she wanted. They bring her
happiness because they are “lighter, more delicate, line[d] things up in neat rows” (127).
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The Breedloves belong to a different epoch of African-American history. But, since
slavery underpins Bluest, at least in terms of its depiction of poverty and racism, I use
Sudarkasha’s discussion of African and Afro-American family to examine the family’s
relational structure.
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While a perverse phenomenon, it is easy to see why she never took any responsibility for
her children and “neglected her house [and] her man—they were like the afterthought one
has just before sleep” (127). Unaware that she is merely an instrument, Pauline finds
meaning in life in terms of her sacrifice for the Fishers. Estranged emotionally, her
authentic being is dislocated from her own ground, African-American sensibility.
It is also important to recapitulate here Pauline’s exposure to the ethos of the
mainstream culture to further shed light on why she behaves the way she does. In her
account, “Once I went to see Clark Gable and Jean Harlow. I fixed my hair up like I’d
seen hers on a magazine. A part on the side, with one little curl on my forehead. It looked
just like her. Well, almost just like” (123). With the internalization of the dominant myth
of beauty, Pauline loses her belief in herself captured in her desire to look like Clark
Gable and Jean Harlow. The desire to invest in her looks is borne of a sense of inferiority
she suffers and thus demonstrates how the dominant ethos corrupts her conscience and
depletes her sense of self-worth. Additionally, the investiture in appearance signifies selfloathing as well as a desperate attempt to be intelligible as Dasein in a culture where
Gable and Harlow are considered the epitome of beauty so that she could gain respect
and recognition. Not only have the mainstream values distorted her understanding of
herself but also impacted her relationship with others. For example, Pauline measures
each person’s worth based on one’s appearance but not one’s humanity: “She was never
able, after her education in the movies, to look at a face and not assign it some category
in the scale of absolute beauty, and the scale was one she absorbed in full from the silver
screen” (122).
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Cholly’s story is no different. Like Pauline, he too has a difficult past: “When
Cholly was four days old, his mother wrapped him in two blankets and one newspaper
and placed him on a junk heap” (132). Later, his aunt takes care of him. But her untimely
death affects Cholly as it leaves him with a sense of void. All he has is his memory of
her. He searches for all that was left in his world, his father. But, when Cholly meets him
in Georgia, he refuses to recognize him: “Who sent you?” (156). Cholly must have been
certain that his father would take him. But, now shuddered by the thought that his father
disowns him, Cholly “could not remember his mother’s name. Had he ever known it?
What could he say? Whose boy was he? He couldn’t say, ‘I’m your boy.’ That sounded
disrespectful.” His father further asks, “Something wrong with your head?”—disowning
him eventually: “Who told you to come after me? . . . Tell that bitch she get her money.
Now, get the fuck outta my face!” When his father denies interaction and doubts his
sanity, they crush Cholly to the very core of his being. In his search for his father, a
symbolic quest for ontological rootedness, he wished to bond with and bring his
disoriented self to wholeness. But his pursuit turns into a disappointment when his father
rejects him. Cholly can now turn to nowhere. The betrayal by his father, which denies
him to be a part of African-American heritage, changes the course of his destiny forever
as it challenges him to reinvent himself out of nothing, a new identity detached from the
old one, which is impossible. Kicked out of kinship and with no one to relate to, Cholly
has no choice but to return home heavy-hearted.
It is important to mention that not only is Cholly left to himself, like a shelterless
orphan, with no point of reference that would give meaning to his existence, but also his
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community does not recognize his humanity. For example, after the funeral of his aunt
Jimmy, Cholly and a girl named Darlene follow a path that led to “an edge of the pine
woods” (146). The escapade was an opportunity for intimacy, but two “white men . . .
one with a spirit lamp, the other with a flashlight,” appear out of nowhere and force
Cholly to make love with Darlene. “The men had long guns. ‘Hee hee hee heeeeee.’ The
snicker was a long asthmatic cough. The other raced the flashlight over Cholly and
Darlene” (147). Cholly could not bring himself to what he was forced to do, but his body
had already become their possession: “I said, get on wid it. An’ make it good, nigger,
make it good” (148). With no choice left and “with violence born out of total
helplessness, he pulled her dress up, lowered his trousers and underwear [but] he could
do no more than make-believe.” When this intrusion occurs, while “Darlene put[s] her
hand over her face. . . . Cholly began to simulate what had gone on before.”
The emotional damage done by the men is apparent. Cholly leaves the scene in
shame, shielding himself from the debilitating experience of insignificance, “moving
faster, [he] looked at Darlene. He hated her. He almost wished he could do it—hard, long,
and painfully, he hated her so much” (148). The feeling of shame leads to a loss of
respect for the body. This becomes manifest in the form of Cholly’s contempt for
Darlene. What he feels about her, who is the weaker of the two, is a typical reaction to
shame. Psychologically, by hating Darlene, Cholly could restore his dignity and feel
authentic, a perverse phenomenon. Abandoned by his mother, rejected by his father, and
disconnected from his roots, and “having never watched any parent raise himself, he
could not even comprehend what such a relationship should be” (160). With nobody to
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look to for guidance, Cholly had no past experience as to how he should comport himself
with others. What he suffered in his childhood and teenage years created who he had
become now.
While Pecola lives in an existentially hostile world with parents who project their
angst onto their children, the MacTeers daughters of another black family live in an
affectionate familial environment, a world that resembles the ideal picture that
Sudarkasha draws of the African-American family. The MacTeers are warm and loving
and are relentlessly invested in the emotional well-being of their children. If Pecola is
naïve, Claudia, one of the MacTeers’ daughters, has confidence in herself and is defiant
in character. This is evident in an incident where she takes apart a white baby doll, an
epitome of beauty, in her attempt to understand aspects that make the toy so attractive to
everybody:
I fingered the face, wondering at the single-stroke eyebrows; picked at the
pearly teeth stuck like two piano keys between red bowline lips . . . . I could
examine it to see what it was that all the world said was lovable. Break off the
tiny fingers, bend the flat feet, loosen the hair, twist the head around, and the
thing made one sound. . . . Remove the cold and stupid eyeball, it would bleat
still, ‘Ahhhhhh,’ take off the head, shake out the sawdust, crack the back
against the brass bed rail, it would bleat still. The gauze back would split, and
I could see the disk with six holes, the secret of the sound. A mere roundness.
(21)
In the American cultural imagination of the era in which Bluest is set, the doll is adorned
as an epitome of beauty. Within the existing political system, the doll functions as a
privileged signifier, an icon of beauty as well as an emblem of power. Given this, when
Claudia seeks an explanation for why the doll carries such weight, the act bears a great
symbolic significance because it uncannily questions the ethos of the dominant group.
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Also, the destruction of the doll is an existential act of being herself as herself. If the
assertion of her identity involves an outrage against the monopoly of signification, that is
what she is capable to do. Claudia can listen to the call of her own conscience and can
become who she is.
While Claudia has strength of character, Pecola is naive. It seems as if her identity
should be shaped by the ideal of beauty produced by the dominant culture. “Each night,”
according to the narrator, Pecola “prayed for blue eyes. Fervently, for a year she had
prayed. Although somewhat discouraged, she was not without hope. To have something
as wonderful as that happen would take a long, long time” (35). Pecola wants blue eyes
as if they would grant her authenticity as a person, granting her meaning, validation and
recognition. When she attributes much value to blue eyes, desire holds her hostage
leading to a confused state of being. Pecola begins to disintegrate psychologically.
Pecola is thrown into a neighborhood where people neither show regard to her
innocence nor any respect to her budding sexual identity. When she discovers she is
menstruating, a physiological enigma, a neighbor woman, Rosemary, yells, “Mrs.
MacTeer! Mrs. MacTeer! Frieda and Claudia are out here playing nasty! They’re playing
nasty, Mrs. MacTeer. Look” (30). Among other black members of the community,
Geraldine judges people by their appearance and attractiveness because she is “pretty
milk brown” (92), a sign of privilege in a system that values whiteness. A victim of
“cognitive cultural hegemony,” her vision is clouded by ethos of the dominant culture
(Bruce McConachie 134). At home Geraldine teaches her son, Louis, to play only with
the “White kids” and avoid “niggers” (Bluest 87). Forced to construe his self in terms of

37
what he is not, Junior is psychologically disoriented. For illustration of this point, I would
like to recall an incident where Louis invites Pecola into his home and in a fit of rage
throws his mother’s cat in her face. Here, the question is not so much what Louis does,
but why he does it. While “more than anything in the world [Louis] wanted to play King
of the Mountain and have [black boys] push him down the mound to dirt and roll over
him,” his mother forces him to avoid them (87). Sensibly, he “wanted to feel their
hardness pressing on him, smell their wild blackness, and say ‘Fuck you’ with that lovely
casualness.” But “his mother did not like him to play with niggers. She had explained to
him the difference between colored people and niggers. They were easily identifiable.
Colored people were neat and quiet, niggers were dirty and loud. He belonged to the
former group”: Junior “wore white shirts and blue trousers; his hair was cut as close to
his scalp as possible to avoid any suggestion of wool, the part was etched into his hair by
the barber. In winter his mother put Jergens Lotion on his face to keep the skin from
becoming ashen.” A boy who was forced to grow up despising blackness, it is not hard to
understand why Louis inflicts harm upon the cat and blames Pecola for it. In a
psychoanalytical sense, when he hurts the cat he takes revenge against his mother who
forces him to despise everything African American.
While Louis behaves insanely, obsessed with whiteness and prejudiced against
blackness and thus paradoxically against herself, Geraldine vents her anger upon Pecola,
calling her a “nasty little black bitch” and asks her to “get out of my house” (92). Pecola
is a site of blackness, which Geraldine loathes because it does not conform to the ideal
standard of beauty she has internalized. Her attitude recalls Dixon, who observes that
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“The Caucasian standard as a measuring stick for beauty began for African Americans
during slavery with class divisions by Whites. During slavery, those who were closest in
physical appearance to Whites were considered superior and given more status” (73).
Geraldine’s refusal to recognize the worth of people with darker skin suggests that her
exposure to dominant beliefs has given birth to a ghostly figure of the prejudiced system
inside her being who not only measures her worth in terms of whiteness but also dictates
her choices and behavior.5 Influenced by the prejudiced system that fosters perceptions of
inferiority of the blacks, Geraldine has relegated any human recognition of people of her
kind to the margins of her being.
In everyday existence, Pecola perpetually finds herself around people who are
insensitive to her feelings. She suffers from, to use Heidegger’s terms, Nachsehen, the
“ruthless disregard of the other [or] the indifferent mode of forbearance” (Being 78). In
public places, others fail to recognize her worth as an individual: “When one of the girls
at school wanted to be particularly insulting to a boy, or wanted to get an immediate
response from him, she could say, ‘Bobby loves Pecola Breedlove! Bobby loves Pecola
Breedlove’” (Bluest 46). Maureen Peel avoids her as unworthy of friendship because she
is white in appearance, which distinguishes her from others. When Pecola visits a store,
the grocer, Mr. Yacobowski, ignores her: “She looks up at him and sees the vacuum
where curiosity ought to lodge. And something more. The total absence of human
recognition—the glazed separateness. . . . He hesitates, not wanting to touch her hand.
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In Specters of Marx, Derrida uses haunting to refer to a “non-object, this non-present
present, this being-there of an absent or departed one no longer belongs to” (5), which he
characterizes as ghostly. Here, I use ghost to refer to the non-present present regime
inscribed within Geraldine’s psyche, which haunts her and induces a desire for what she
lacks.
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Finally, he reaches over and takes the pennies from her hand. His nails graze her damp
palm” (49-50). In an existential sense, Yacobowski is not aware of Pecola’s significance
as Dasein. His looking at her but not seeing her is indicative of “being for, against, or
without one another, passing one another by, not ‘mattering’ to one another” (Heidegger,
Being 158). It is a ruthless disregard of Pecola. A man who has a strong aversion for what
the dominant culture detests, Yacobowski eliminates her from any human recognition.
The experiences of lack of love and of not mattering to others shows how she stands as
Dasein in the world she shares with others.
While individual sense of the self is bound up with the ability to experience one’s
humanity, others feel nothing but contempt for Pecola. She was the “only member of her
class who sat alone at a double desk. . . . Her teachers tried never to glance at her, and
called on her only when everyone was required to respond” (Bluest 45-46). While the
character of each individual is different, the school community in entirety treats Pecola as
a pariah in that what it expects her to be and what it sees in her as a person do not match.
When others fail to recognize her, they limit her possibility for being. There are no
alternatives available to her with which to make sense of herself other than relying on the
knowledge others supply to her. What others say and believe shape her perception;
Pecola begins to be fixated on blue eyes: “It had occurred to Pecola . . . that if her eyes,
those eyes that held the pictures, and knew the sights—if those eyes of hers were
different, that is to say, beautiful, she herself would be different” (46). She searches for
evidence of her ugliness: “Long hours she sat looking at the mirror, trying to discover the
secret of the ugliness, the ugliness that made her ignored or despised” (45), only to
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discover herself in terms of how others see her. Pecola accepts her ugliness as an aspect
of her ontology. When she begins to see her body as others see her, she becomes a sight
of terror to her gaze.
In her relationships with others, Pecola is deprived of her true ontology. This
deprivation leads to a state where she wants her eyes to disappear. But, “try as she might,
she could never get her eyes to disappear.” Only if members of her family would
intervene could they shield her from external insults and protect her from the destructive
desire that has become pathological. Convinced that she is ugly because of lacking blue
eyes, “she stood there, her hands folded across her stomach, a little protruding pot of
tummy. ‘Maybe, Maybe you can do it for me.’ ‘Do what for you’? ‘My eyes.’ ‘What
about your eyes?’ “I want them blue”’ (Bluest 173-74). Commenting upon this state of
being, Yancy writes, like Vladimir and Estragon in Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for Godot,
Pecola is in “search of something that will provide deep metaphysical stability in life”
(307). Yancy suggests that Pecola wants an ontological anchor, a mooring to her self. The
obsession with blue eyes can be read as an ontological experience and a cruelty to one’s
own being in that by wanting blue eyes she mistakes them for her own Dasein. China,
Poland, and Miss Marie are the only ones who accept Pecola as who she is and recognize
her individual worth. She “loved them, visited them, and ran their errands” (Bluest 51).
Comforting as it must be for her to have them as friends, her friendship with them is not
adequate to nurture self-protective strategies against the sexual abuse she suffers at the
hands of her own father Cholly.
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It is relevant here to recall Michael Steno and his colleagues who in “The Sexual
Preferences of Incest Offenders” explain the reasons of paternal sexual abuse. According
to them, in cases where the fathers are uninvolved in child rearing and lack intimate
emotional bonding, incidents of rape occur. Further, fathers turn to their children when
there is a “limited access to their sexual partner” (271). In absence of an emotional
anchor and a loving partner, they “resort to targets lower on their sexual preference
gradient” (271). It is important to mention here that Pauline does not express her sexual
passion as intensely as she used to: “But it ain’t like that anymore. Most times he’s
thrashing away inside me before I’m awoke, and through when I am” (Bluest 131).
Cholly drifts away into his romantic past: “The confused mixture of his memories of
Pauline and the doing of a wild forbidden thing [excites] him.” Such tendency interferes
with his thought process, distorts his memory, and disables his ability to wake up to the
reality of things. When he sees Pecola’s “timid, tucked-in look of the scratching toe—that
was what Pauline was doing the first time he saw her in Kentucky” (162), he rapes her.
So lost in fantasy and mentally deranged, Cholly makes emotional misconnections
between his wife and his daughter. The ontological eros, symbolized by Pecola’s foot,
triggers his repressed desires. When memory overwhelms, desire liberates Cholly, letting
him relive the past. His daughter becomes a supplement for what he lacks, which is love,
sex, and acceptance. From another perspective, the violation of the dignity of his
daughter is a perverted mirror image of what he had suffered at the hands of the white
men.
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While the young Pecola knows little to nothing about what transpired between her
and her father and while she needs protection and moral support, her mother blames her.
Instead of protecting her feelings, providing emotional support, and holding her father
accountable for what happened, women in her community gossip that “the girl was
always foolish. . . . She carry some of the blame. . . . How come she didn’t fight him?”
(Bluest 189). Interested only in what happened, they criticize her for not attempting to
protect by herself. Rejected and wrecked by a desire for blue eyes, Pecola retreats within
the recess of her own being:
I was so lonely for friends. And you were right here.
Right before my eyes. No, honey. Right after your eyes.
What? What does Maureen think about your eyes?
She doesn’t say anything about them.
Has she said anything to you about them?
No. Nothing.
Do you like Maureen?
Oh. She’s all right. For a half-white girl, that is. (196)
In absence of an ontological basis by which to orient her self, Pecola feels homeless. She
longs for a company and finds one in her own imaginary double. Her thinking has held
her captive, compromising her ability to project herself as Dasein. Pecola, who now holds
an imaginary conversation with her own self, has become a space of unintelligibility.
Estranged from her own consciousness, she has withdrawn within a recess of her being,
which is an unusual way of existing and a poignant reminder of an inauthentic mode of
being.
In spatial-temporal sense, Pecola suffers from displacement. Distressed and
mentally disoriented, in a drunken stupor, her father Cholly burns his house down. With
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the loss of dwelling, Pecola’s mother was “staying with the woman she worked for; the
boy, Sammy, was with some other family; and Pecola was to stay with [the MacTeers]”
(Bluest 18). We are told that “she came with nothing. No little paper bag with the other
dress, or a nightgown, or two pair of whitish cotton bloomers. She just appeared with a
white woman and sat down” (18). George Yancy explains the state of being homeless as
an “ontological stasis, a sense of nothingness” (307). I suggest that the incident gives us a
glimpse of an ontological state in which Pecola’s dwelling, both in terms of staying in
“one place” and “being at peace,” have been disrupted (Heidegger, “Building” 146-47),
which renders authentic being impossible.
Pecola’s current state of mind is an ontological event, an instance of the
unhomeliness of Dasein because she cannot articulate “the intelligibility of being there”
(Being 205). If the familial and social environments had been different, Pecola would not
have lost her sanity, which reveals that individual authentic ontology is not self-made but
is constituted by self-other relational dialectic. Marx and Engels point out that the
“essence of [each individual] is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its
reality it is the ensemble of the social relations” (573). For a young black girl like Pecola,
there is nothing worse than to find herself among people who are apathetic to the very
core of their being. Her fate reveals that the self can reach an authentic awareness of itself
only in relationships with others. Correlates of being, others enable the self to be relevant
and intelligible as what it is. In the absence of others as ontological structures of being,
the self grows toward inauthenticity.

CHAPTER TWO
THE REDEMPTIVE POWER OF LOVE AND RELATIONSHIP: LESLIE
MARMON SILKO’S CEREMONY
No man is an island, entire of itself;
every man is a piece of the Continent,
a part of the main.
--John Donne
What I write about and what I’m
concerned about are relationships.
That’s all there really is. . . . That’s all
I’m interested in.
--Leslie Marmon Silko

While at the end of Morrison’s Bluest Pecola goes insane, Tayo, a war-torn veteran
in Silko’s Ceremony, heals to the point of being able to survive and share his story with
his community and live in peace. One wonders what lies behind these stories of doom
and survival. Why does a person who has been through war and lived with its trauma heal
while Pecola fades into inauthenticity? How can his emotional and mental health go so
wrong but recover eventually? How is love manifested and how do his social and
physical worlds contribute to his healing process? How do care, empathy, and love aid
him in regaining his sense of being and salvaging his self?
Native American writer and critic Paula Gunn Allen argues that Tayo is sick
because he is separated from what she calls the “ancient unity of person, ceremony, and
land” (119). In her view, he is “an empty space, . . . a vapor, an outline . . . formless, for
his being is unshaped, undistinguished from the mass it sprang from” (120). When Tayo
recognizes his unity with the native world and begins to “live the stories both new and
old,” he is put onto the path of recovery. According to Carol Mitchell:
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Silko’s novel is itself a curing ceremony. . . . Not only is Tayo cured by the
old stories and changing ceremonies, but the form of the novel may bring a
new storytelling tradition into the Indian tradition that will help to cure some of
the hopelessness and despair of the contemporary Indian who is caught
between two ways of life. (28)
Likewise, reading Tayo’s ordeal in terms of the restorative power of Laguna rituals,
Kenneth Lincoln claims that “Silko’s novel is a word ceremony. It tells Tayo’s story as a
curative act. She writes out of an old medicinal regard for word-spirits powerful enough
to make things happen” (237). According to Michael Day, “By striving to separate the
interwoven threads of his life experience [Tayo] fragments his sense of identity, which
should have its basis in the traditional interconnectedness” (5). Day writes, only when he
“begins to understand his place in nature and society [and] finds himself in the story by
realizing the continuum between individual, community, nature, and myth” can healing
take place (6-7). For Kristin Herzog, “When Tayo [rediscovers] the motherhood of the
earth and the nurturing spirit instilled in him by his elders when he was a child, he is
healed” (31).
Since scholars have discussed Laguna myths, culture, and ceremony at great lengths
in explaining how Tayo becomes what he becomes, my own attempt in making sense of
his troubled being will make use of recent findings in neuroscience and existential
philosophy. I argue that Silko situates Tayo within an existential context, brings major
events of his life to our view, and reveals how it is only when he is integrated into family
and society that his broken self may be mended. A starting point for this discussion is to
provide an explanation for Tayo’s mental illness and then discuss factors that put him on
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a path to recovery. There is no other passage in the novel that better features Tayo’s
mental distress than this:
Tayo didn’t sleep well. . . . He tossed in the old iron bed, and the coiled springs
kept squeaking even after he lay still again, calling up humid dreams of black
night and loud voices rolling him over and over again like debris caught in a
flood. Tonight the singing had come first, squeaking out of the iron bed, a man
singing in Spanish . . . . Sometimes the Japanese voice came first, angry loud,
and then . . . the voices would become Laguna voices, and he could hear Uncle
Josiah calling to him. . . . But before Josiah could come, the fever voices would
drift and whirl and emerge again—Japanese soldiers shouting orders to him . . .
and he heard the women’s voices then; they faded in and out until he was
frantic because he thought the Laguna words were his mother’s. . . . He could
get no rest as long as the memories were tangled with the present. (5-6)
Tayo wrestles with disturbing memories but gets defeated. Caught in the mayhem created
by the memories, he tosses and turns in bed, never finding his way to sleep. His thinking
gets tangled when the stream of his thoughts disrupts his sleep pattern, blurring the line
between sanity and insanity. Trapped inside the liminal space between the two, he lives a
nightmarish life.1
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Although a fictional character, if we look into the way past memories disrupt Tayo’s
thinking, we see in him one of the most painful states of human existence. His deluded
state of being not only adds to our understanding of the complexities of life but also
increases our capacity to understand the reasons that lead to such a situation. Therefore,
to put his ordeal into perspective, I will draw from recent findings in neuroscience and
studies in sleep disorder. In their study of sleep, William Dement and Christopher
Vaughan write, “When sleep fails, the borderline between waking consciousness and
sleeping stops functioning as it should; stops being the well-defined, well-controlled life
we expect. We are forced to fend for ourselves in the lawless borderlands between the
two” (128). A man who has lost the sense of his being, Tayo tries to make sense of
thoughts in his attempt to grapple with reality, but he cannot. When he fails to fight
against the tyranny of the past, he succumbs to its power and slips out of touch with
reality. Sleep fails him. This leads to his failure to control his physiological responses. In
Dement and Vaughan’s terms, Tayo is in a war zone; while “wakefulness refuses to
surrender to sleep, sleep invades [his] walking moments” (128). A man rendered
powerless by traumatic memories, he lives halfway between dreaming and awareness,
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The sources of Tayo’s mental disorientation lie in his past, particularly the absence
of his mother and the neglect he suffered in the hands of his maternal aunt while he was a
baby. At the age of four, his mother deserted him to his aunt who pays all her attention to
Rocky, because he “had been her own son,” and ignores Tayo (29). It is cruel of her that
“she wanted [Tayo] close enough to feel excluded, to be aware of the distance between
them” (67). If the aunt is biased, she is deliberately so because she sees Tayo as an
“unfortunate burden.” Conscious of lineage and dignity, she takes him only to conceal
her sister’s ugly past. What could be a worse way to grow into adulthood? Sadly, the aunt
shames him for faults not his own. “Since [Tayo] could remember,” the narrator says, “he
had known Auntie’s shame for what his mother had done, and Auntie’s shame for him”
(57). Not only did Tayo suffer humiliation but also feared physical abuse. When he
performs such mischievous acts as taking his grandma’s weaving basket out to play, in
fear of his Auntie’s reproach, he hurriedly picks up the threads (7). A secure child might
not have adopted such measures. Cruelest of all, when Tayo would cling to his mother’s
picture, an unconscious attempt to compensate for the lack of love, Auntie would take it
from him. With no love between himself and his aunt, the pathway of his psychological
development is compromised.2

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  

sleeping and wakefulness. How does it all begin? What repairs his thinking and prevents
him from relapsing into such painful moments? This discussion is intended as an answer
to these questions.
2

James Garbarino and Cyleste Collins argue that the “effects of neglect are more severe
than those from abuse” on children, particularly on their cognitive and emotional
development (2). Garbarino and Collins write, “Individuals with a history of childhood
abuse and/or neglect possess a genetic susceptibility to depression that drives an
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In addition to abandonment and neglect, Tayo suffers from anonymity and racism.
Thrown into a racist world, a world that projects a stereotypical identity on him for being
a mixed-blood, when he finds himself among his peers, he becomes a subject of ridicule.
As a grown-up boy, he must have longed to play with his friends, but they drive him to
despair: “‘Mexican eyes’, he said, ‘the other kids used to tease me’” (99). Subjected to
contempt, Tayo begins to feel insecure in his own being. The emotional harm of how
others perceive him is evident in his desire for “dark eyes like other people.” As
destructive as the stereotyping attitude of his friends is the indifferent attitude of “white
women” (40), who, according to Tayo, “never looked at me until I put on that uniform.”
Tayo is in a relational context, which is threatening to his being. As if a threat to their
identity, the white women ignore him and act with indifference. In so doing, not only do
they render Tayo invisible, that he is nobody, but also deny the opportunity to come into
meaningful relationships. This frightening sense that there is nobody to love intensifies
his worthlessness. Thus, the history surrounding Tayo’s mother since she deserted him is
less known to us, but the effect of her absence in his daily life is clear.
Grandmother and Uncle Josiah are the ones who care for Tayo. Keepers of the
Laguna heritage, they are affectionate and supportive. Tayo has a loving and nurturing
relationship with Josiah, from whom he learns about the Laguna tribe, its traditions, and
its beliefs. They spend time together, help each other out, and grow up as brothers. But,
this bond does not last long. Swayed by his cousin Rocky, Tayo joins the military and
enters into the quagmire of the Second World War. While fighting in the Pacific islands,
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  

increased sensitivity to life events.” Tayo’s sensitivity to the shooting of the Japanese
soldiers is predictable.
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he endures the most horrifying of experiences. The memories of the mutilated corpses
that “looked too familiar even when they were alive” haunt him (7). The most distressing
memory of all is the one where “the Japanese soldiers [are] lined up in front of the cave
with their hands on their heads” and Tayo is ordered to shoot them, but cannot. Rocky
advises him to “look past the blood,” and says ‘Tayo, this is a Jap!’. . . And then he rolled
the body over with his boot and said, ‘Look, Tayo, look at the face’” (8). When this fails,
Rocky rationalizes the murder: “Tayo, we’re supposed to be here. This is what we’re
supposed to do.” Tayo examines the “facts and logic again and again the way Rocky had
explained to him, [but] the facts made what he had seen an impossibility. He felt
shivering then.” A morally sensitive man, Tayo does not consider the Japanese soldiers as
enemy combatants because “they looked too familiar even when they were alive” (7).
When confronted with the gruesome images and situations, his mind starts to fail him.
Recent findings in neuroscience help us explain why Tayo reacts to wartime events
as he does. In a study of the brain activities of people in pain and those who watch them,
Miiamaaria V. Saarela and Yevhen Hlushchuck found that corresponding regions are
activated in both brains. According to them, “not only the presence of pain but also the
intensity of the observed pain is encoded in the observer’s brain” (230). Saarela and
Hlushchuck call the cognitive correlation between the brains “sensory mirroring.” When
Tayo sees mutilation, pain, and death, his mind presumably begins to replicate the state
of mind of the Japanese soldiers. For him, a “man’s skin was not much different from his
own” (7). While his fellow soldiers fire at the captives, he stands “stiff with nausea” (8).
The Japanese soldiers are enemy combatants for his war buddies, but not for Tayo, who
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“watched his uncle fall, and […] knew it was Josiah.” Being morally unable to justify
deaths in war leaves him deeply wounded emotionally.
Tayo comes out of combat alive but emotionally broken. The death of his cousin
leaves a great void in his heart and a sense of guilt that he failed to save his cousin. Ever
since his return from the war, he cries for the Japanese who were killed during the battle
because “he doesn’t hate the Japanese” (43). The only positive thing is that his aunt’s
neglect of him has given way to acceptance, quite a change of heart: “This time she
would keep him because he was all she had left” (29). The aunt doesn’t feel any
resentment toward him. But in the eyes of others, he is a “nobody” and is treated like a
second-class citizen. His feeling is that “the war was over, the uniform was gone. All of a
sudden that man at the store waits on you last. . . . [a]nd the white lady at the bus depot,
[is] careful not to touch your hand when she counts out your change” (42). It was only
during wartime that “they had been treated first class. . . . As long as there had been a war
and. . . the Japs and Hitler” (165). The fading of the initial euphoria adds to his angst.
Ravaged by war, ignored by the country they fought for, and disheartened that “they
belonged to America [only] during the war” (43), Tayo and his war buddies gather at the
Dixie Tavern and drown themselves in liquor. Alcohol has become “medicine for the
anger that made them hurt” (40). Tayo usually remains quiet, but he suffers from
nightmares and nausea and lives in a state of duality and division.
The stay at the veterans’ hospital further compound Tayo’s problem. While the
medicine drains his memory, the doctors advise him to “think only of himself, and not
about the others, that he would never get well as long as he used words like ‘we’ and
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‘us’” (125). A man whose moral constitution is undermined by the activities in which he
is engaged, Tayo is in a desperate need of emotional connection, but the doctors prevent
him from stepping outside, advising that he face his ordeal alone. In denying the
opportunity to feel connected, the doctors deny Tayo any recourse to meaningful
relationships. Such advice is not only harmful but also disingenuous. The doctors might
see the solution of his distress in “monistic” terms, but the social dimensions of self
cannot be so easily ignored.3 From an individualistic perspective, it may make sense that
Tayo take care of himself, but as long as he is left all by himself, he is not only isolated
from his community but also left with the terror of solitude.
Apache philosopher V. F. Cordova’s discussion of ethics may shed some light on
the harm the doctors are doing to Tayo. In “Ethics: The We and the I,” Cordova draws a
distinction between Western and American Indian moral philosophy and argues that the
West bases its ethical principles on the ideal of the “individual as the ‘bargaining unit’. . .
. [T]here is a fundamental description of the human being as essentially an individual
which is potentially autonomous” (173). In the Western conception of the human being,
“The term autonomous,” Cordova argues, is associated with “an individual that exists
isolated and solitary [and to] the notion that this individual can act in such a manner that
he can become a law unto himself: the ‘I’ is conceived as containing the capacity to be
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It is impossible for Tayo to mend his broken self on his own. If he were, as the doctors
advise, to forget about others and regress within the boundary of his self, it would not
only dislocate him from the interpersonal realm but also put his existence at risk. His
healing is bound up with the projection of his being, being in love, and coming into
meaningful relationships.
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‘self-determining.’” This is why “the West, both Christian and secular,” Cordova claims,
“is [. . .] offended when humans are compared to bees and ants. This vision of a human as
a naturally social being calls up images of ‘the mindless herd’. . . or the ‘unthinking
masses’” (174). Accordingly, in cultures that define humanity in atomistic terms, every
individual is an essential bargaining unit and is “‘at war with each and every other
individual.”
In contrast, Native Americans believe that “humans exist in the state of the ‘We.’”
For them, an individual is a part of the larger reality. In this scheme, “the autonomous
person is one who is aware of the needs of others as well as being aware of what the
individual can do for the good of the group. ‘Autonomy,’ in this case, would be defined
as self-initiative—combined with a high-degree of self-sufficiency” (178).4 Cordova’s
distinction between American Indian and Western conceptualization of the self provides
an insight into the differences in perspective between Tayo and the doctors who provide
him care at the veterans’ hospital. What the doctors think it proper for him to do is based
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Cordova’s ethical formulations anticipate modern findings on how cultures affect selfrepresentation. In one study, neuroscientists Ying Zhu and his colleagues studied the
functional magnetic resonance imaging of both Eastern and Western subjects in order to
see the role culture plays in shaping the “neural basis of culture-self interaction.” They
wanted to locate the “substrates of self-representation” (1310) so as to find out the
regions of the brain of the Chinese and Western subjects that were involved when they
think about themselves, their mothers, and a public person. The imaging data showed that
while the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) of the Chinese subjects was highly activated
when they were thinking of themselves and their mothers, the MPFC of the Western
individuals was enhanced only when they were thinking of themselves (1310). Based on
their findings, Ying Zhu and his colleagues suggest that the Chinese self includes
intimate persons, but Western self includes nobody—others do not exist inside the head
of the Western subjects.
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on an individualistic ethical system in which there are no correlates to the self, but their
advising Tayo to focus on himself is psychologically harmful. Cordova points out, in “a
group that defines the individual as a social being, ostracism, exclusion from the group, is
. . . an extreme form of punishment” (175). A man who was raised in what Cordova calls
We-culture, how could Tayo, as the doctors urge him to, find his own foundations in
isolation and grasp his own ground and root himself as the measure and ground of all?
If it is true that we cannot explain Tayo’s sickness without a retrospective
understanding of his past, it is also true that his recovery cannot be understood without
considering conditions that lead in that direction. Tayo’s road to recovery begins when
his grandmother knows that he is not well and “needs a medicine man” (33). But, his aunt
does not want Tayo go to the community for help in fear that “someone will say it’s not
right.” It is only when, with the authority that matriarchal protocol grants her,
Grandmother invites Ku’oosh, a Laguna medicine man, that a healing ceremony for her
grandson can be performed. During the rite, Tayo listens carefully to Ku’oosh, who
speaks “softly, using the old dialect full of sentences that were involuted with
explanations of their own origins” (34). After a ceremony through storytelling, Ku’oosh
leaves, but what he has done and said lead Tayo to think. He makes a tremendous effort
to make sense of what Ku’oosh said, which is a step toward gaining a sense of being, if
not giving coherence to his otherwise broken self.
Later, at Ku’oosh and Grandmother’s request, Tayo visits Betonie, a Navaho
medicine man, who mixes traditional herbs with modern medicine. Betonie tells Tayo,
“We know these hills, and we are comfortable here” (117). The insights Betonie gives
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and the protected space he creates restore Tayo’s sense of a secure reality. Likewise,
reverence for the land lifts Tayo’s spirit, begetting a sense of historical continuity: “There
was something about the way the old man said the word ‘comfortable.’ It had a different
meaning—not the comfort of big houses or rich food or even clean streets, but the
comfort of belonging with the land, and the peace of being with these hills.” Listening to
what Betonie says, Tayo has “a vague feeling that he knew something which he could not
remember.” He then “studied the pictures and names on the calendars. He recognized
names of stores in Phoenix and Albuquerque . . . . [and] the pictures for the years 1939
and 1940” (121). What is important from Betonie’s point of view is that Tayo at least
recognizes the pictures and the names of the places, which “gives [him] some place to
start.” As long as memory is there, cognition is operative and the body animate and there
is a chance for healing.
It takes Tayo some time to realize that Betonie cares, a tenuous and yet telling step
forward toward a change in perspective. While initially he was hesitant about letting
anything come out of himself or articulating his thoughts, when he realizes that he
matters, Tayo begins to speak: “‘I wonder sometimes,’ he said, ‘because my mother went
with white men.’ He stopped there, unable to say any more. The birth had betrayed his
mother and brought shame to the family and to the people” (128). More often, he used to
be preoccupied with tormenting war memories, but Tayo begins to share what is in his
mind. This is no small step. It is in this process of sharing and of projecting his being that
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Tayo experiences the world. The exchange also links his mind to Betonie’s.5 He tells how
he felt when he was forced by the doctors at the veterans’ hospital in Los Angeles to
think only about himself, and now he knows all too well that “medicine didn’t work that
way, because the world didn’t work that way” (125). This clarification both captures the
temporal unfolding of being and suggests that Tayo’s mind is working, a needed
foundation for reorienting his perspective.
Betonie listens to Tayo, feels intensely about his situation, and inquires about Rocky,
explaining that “accidents happen, and there’s little we can do. But don’t be so quick to
call something good or bad. There are balances and harmonies always shifting, always
necessary to maintain” (130). A man whose attention usually wandered away into
rumination, Tayo begins to be attentive: “What he could feel was powerful, but he was
not sure what it was” (124). He tells Betonie that Rocky “wanted to get away from the
reservation; he wanted to make something of himself. In a city somewhere” (131). In
Betonie’s effort to lay the foundation essential for healing, if not totally change the
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Recent findings in neuroscience help explain the role relationships play in helping Tayo
heal. In a study, Greg Stephens, Lauren Silbert, and Uri Hasson “applied fMRI activity
from both speakers and listeners” in order to see the “spatial and temporal coupling
between production and comprehension across brains during verbal communication” (1).
When they studied the fMRI images, they found that in cases where the listener’s
responses matched almost exactly with the speakers’, both brains had similar “neural
patterns.” In a successful communication there is a “neural coupling” between the mind
of the speaker and the listener. In “I Can Make Your Brain Look Like Mine,” Uri Hasson
claims, “Communication is a single act performed by two brains [and in] good
communication, a listener’s brain activity actually begins to mirror the speaker’s brain
activity” (2).
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perception, it appears that he is successful, and things have moved in that direction, for it
is not until now that Tayo is willing to share his feelings.
Betonie next performs rituals on behalf of Tayo and then tells him that things won’t
change much for him until he finds and recovers the stolen cattle (the Mexican breed that
his uncle Josiah had purchased for breeding purposes), locates the pattern of the stars, and
meets a mountain lion and a woman. The challenge for Tayo is to undertake the journey
and to make transitions so as to be whole again, which require spirit and self-confidence
(170) because “‘one night or nine nights won’t do it any more,’ the medicine man said;
‘the ceremony isn’t finished yet’” (152). What is significant about the quest is not so
much its performative aspect, although the act of journeying has a vitalizing effect on his
body, but its call for resolve and emotional control, which are necessary for attaining
mental stability. The journey demands a different state of consciousness, an unshakable
sense of faith and trust and clear focus of mind. Betonie then gives Tayo the option either
to follow his advice and act accordingly or “better get going before dark” and join “the
rest of them, sleeping in mud, vomiting cheap wine, rolling over women” (123). When
Betonie lays out a plan and clarifies its goal, he not only provides Tayo a vantage point
from which to see things but also gives direction to his life. Now, the challenge for Tayo
is to feel the vision, undertake the journey, and complete it.
In To Be Human J. Krishnamurti establishes a link between the contents of our
minds and the quality of lives we live. Krishnamurti conceptualizes consciousness as
constituted by “my conditioning as a Hindu, as a Brahmin, born in India with its tradition,
superstitions, beliefs, dogmas, divisions, with all the gods, and the recent acquisition of a
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new poison called nationalism, and so on” (49). As Krishnamurti explains it,
“Consciousness exists because of its content. Its content makes up consciousness.”
“Consciousness with its contents,” both memories of the past as well as the present,
“makes up the total which you call the ‘me,’ the ego, the person, the psychological
structure of your temperament.” If consciousness is the sum of our experiences, the
sources of our distress lie in the contents of our minds. In order to live a life without
“friction,” we have to be able to observe life as what Krishnamurti calls a “total
movement” so that the mind would be able to be “free of the content of its
consciousness” and thereby to develop the “ability to observe the whole of the ‘we’ with
its content” (50, 54).
If, as Krishnamurti conceptualizes it, our consciousness is our existence and exists
by virtue of its content, Tayo cannot function as a normal human being. His mind feeds
on its contents, creates erroneous perceptions, and compromises his rationality, which
deprives him of his sense of being. What Tayo needs is liberation, liberation from
memories that claim his sanity by producing contradictions in his thinking so that
cognitive restructuration can occur. When he recalls the deaths of Rocky and Josiah, he
falls into despair. Tayo must, to use Krishnamurti terms, “cultivate the ability to be free
of the content of [his] consciousness.” For this to happen, he must nurture the ability to
see the “central image from which all the things begin from which all [his] reactions
come” (39), must get to the heart of the matter, and must find a sensible way to respond
to what happened to him. With the change in perspective that minimizes the risk of
relapse into trauma comes relief which is crucial in enabling Tayo to regulate his
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emotions and to clear away the shadow of confusion and, by extension, the stream of
unnecessary thought.
Recent study on trauma has shown that people with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD) make “idiosyncratic negative interpretations” of past memories, which leads to
the relapse into trauma (Ehlers 143). They are also “confused about the order of events,
suffer memory gaps, [and] fail to remember details that are important for the meaning of
especially distressing parts of the event.” In order to minimize the effects of traumatic
events so that “cognitive restructuring” takes place, distressing memories must be
identified and put in perspective. Equally important, individuals living with PTSD should
reconnect to people, engage in things that matter to them and resume activities they had
given up since the trauma (144). It is true that every so often Tayo recalls events from the
past that activate his trauma, leading to memory lapse. In particular, he interprets trauma
memories idiosyncratically, which distorts his perception. While Rocky was killed by the
Japanese soldiers and while Uncle Josiah died at home, Tayo blames himself for their
deaths. And in an extreme absorption with the sense that he was powerless to prevent
their deaths, “he lay there with the feeling that there was no place left for him [and] no
peace” (32). To minimize the psychological effects of the traumatic events, Tayo must
know the reality of things. For this to happen, he must bring the contents of his mind to
the light of truth so that he can clear up the confusion that surrounds distressing
memories.
As directed by Betonie, Tayo begins his quest to recover the lost cattle. Traumatic
memories cannot so easily be forgotten. However, the journey is a psychic event and has
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a profound impact on his psychological well-being. It controls Tayo’s behavior and
pushes his mind away from idiosyncratic interpretation of things to a new understanding
of them. Among other things, the details that surround traumatic memories rise up into
Tayo’s consciousness. It dawns upon him that his uncle Josiah “couldn’t have been
there. He was thousand miles away, at home in Laguna. We were in the Philippine
jungles. I understand that. I know he couldn’t have been there” (124). This is the first
time since the war that Tayo is able to recall the fact that his uncle was not fighting in the
Philippine jungles. With increased ability to differentiate between misperception and
reality, Tayo could redirect his attention to the truth of the matter. Since his grief is
associated with his faulty perception resulting from his tangled thinking, if he could
disengage his mind from distracting thoughts his mind would attain a level of clarity.
Over time, it would have a cleansing effect on his body and past memories would no
longer haunt. In particular, if Tayo could untangle the web of his thoughts, intrusions of
traumatic memories would become less dominant, and his trauma would not grow toward
his own destruction.
Among other things, the journey distracts Tayo from hurtful memories, instills
strength and perseverance, and expands his vision toward regaining some long-lost
perspective. Tayo, for example, sets out on his expedition with a clear focus of mind. As
the narrator says, “He had been so intent on finding the cattle that he had forgotten all the
events of the past days and past years. Hunting the cattle was good for that. Old Betonie
was right. It was a cure for that, and maybe for other things too” (192). What emerges out
of these moments of reflection is his growing understanding and the accompanying
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strength in his character. Tayo knows that his path to recovery is difficult, but with the
love of compassionate souls such as his grandmother and with Betonie’s guidance, he is
convinced that he can get there. As Betonie has hoped, Tayo is willing to complete the
journey, which is necessary if he is to “keep things right [and] take back what was stolen”
(128). While weary beyond measure, Tayo refuses to give up; he “kicked his boots loose
from the stirrups and stretched his legs” (198). This incident is a clue to what drives him
now: his desire to give the journey a completion. What is working in him is a sheer force
of will. Symbolically, when Tayo kicks his boots loose from the stirrups, he frees himself
from the grip of his oppressive past.
Tayo rides through the prairie all the way up to Mount Taylor. In the late afternoon,
he arrives at the property of Floyd Lee, a rancher, who had kept the lost cattle. While
Tayo was initially directionless, the loss of direction appears to have changed into an
undertaking as well as a true contact with the reality. He can now apply his intention and
attention to the journey evident in his decision to wait, not to hurry, so as to avoid
“foolish mistakes” (189): “In a few hours it would be dark, and he could go after them. It
would be simple. There was no reason to hurry. The cattle would be easy to find because
they stayed close to the south boundary fence.” He then “cuts into the wire as if cutting
away at the lie inside himself, [hoping that] by the time the leaves fell and the acorns
dropped he’d be home with the cattle” (191, 189). The psychological benefits of the
journey are obvious, for his strategic outlook, a sign of clear thinking, shows how far he
has come; his ability to let go of worry and his marked concentration on his mission
constitute evidence that he is on the road to recovery.
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When Tayo enters into the realm of the “they,” despite the progress he has made in
terms of healing, others stand forward, putting his existence at risk. Just when it seems
that he has pulled away from violence and fretful preoccupation with the past, when it
seems that he has drawn nearer to his goal of completing the journey, Emo, one of his
war comrades, drags him toward destruction: “Look at this you half-breed! White son of
a bitch!” Emo says to Tayo, “You can’t hide from this! Look! Your buddy, Harley”
(252). Emo’s mode of being, his offensive attitude, instigates such anger in Tayo that he
is tempted to jam a “screwdriver into Emo’s skull” (253). This incident reveals the
worldliness of Dasein, Tayo. But he keeps quiet regardless of Emo’s attitude. The ability
to remain calm in the face of humiliation suggests that he has been able to become aware
of his own presence as Dasein and the threat that existential reality poses to his self. If
Tayo were to fall into a rage, the costs of such a move would be huge. He would succumb
to violence and derail himself from his mission, eroding what little understanding he has
of his own being, thus damaging his growing sense of self.
Not long before, Tayo had almost killed Emo at Dixie’s tavern when Emo played
“with the teeth . . . bragging ‘We blew them all to hell’” (60-61). “They were,” the
narrator says, “his war souvenirs, the teeth he had knocked out of the corpse of a
Japanese soldier.” While none of the other veterans at the bar resent what Emo says,
Tayo, a morally sensitive person, “jump[s] up from the table panting” and rushes toward
Emo screaming, “Killer. . . Killer!” (63). It is good that Tayo acts thoughtfully and feels
neither remorse nor anger. If Tayo were to get involved in a fight, everybody would
blame him: “The Army doctors would say that the indications of this end had been there
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all along, since his release from the mental ward at the Veterans’ Hospital. The white
people would shake their heads, more proud that . . . these Indians couldn’t seem to make
it” (253). People at home would not care about the truth and “blame liquor, the Army,
and the war.” Violence would destroy Tayo’s faith in himself and derail him from his
mission.
During his search for the stolen cattle, the limits that Tayo’s existence sets for him
further reveal themselves. As he nears the end of his search for the spotted cattle, he runs
into patrolmen who prod him with questions: “‘Where were you going so goddamn fast?’
The voice was hostile . . . . He raised himself up on one hand and looked at them. . . . the
one with the narrow face was agitated and angry. He kept demanding to know what Tayo
was doing there” (199). At this moment of being, Tayo is thrown into finitude, a finitude
where the patrolmen determine the truth and presence of all involved. The projective
character of the patrolmen, so to speak, sets the limit for Tayo’s “being there,” but he
does not surrender to them by behaving frantically. At this point, to keep his mouth shut
may seem uncalled for, but confronted with the limits the patrolmen set for him, Tayo is
wise to close up, “let[ting] them believe anything they wanted” (199). Given what his
existential situation dictates him to do, it is sensitive of him to adopt a serious attitude
and behave proactively. Otherwise, things would turn out badly for him. When he begins
to become clearer in his understanding, what traumatic memories took away from him,
serenity of mind and renewed perspective give him back. With events that occur along
the way and with each hurtful memory cleared out, Tayo comes to feel that he is all right.
And “in the distance he could see the spotted cattle scattered across the valley between
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the mesas” (224). This moment takes on an existential significance, for when Tayo sees
the cattle, he is the most perceptive, which, existentially, suggests that his being has
become manifest, showing itself fully if not yet authentically. As Betonie predicted, Tayo
“could . . . see the stars” (254).
Tayo abides by the rules Betonie gave him. His approach to life has become much
more rational than ever before and he has no difficulty controlling his emotions, but his
ability to be calm and to come to grips with distressing emotions alone are not enough for
healing. His emotional health is tied to close relationships that assure him that he is
worthy of love and affection. Tayo’s experience of love with Ts’eh, “a Montaño” woman,
is a case in point. Like Betonie, she listens to Tayo and keeps him close to her with
parental affection. Recalling his stay at the veterans’ hospital, she tells him, “‘The doctors
have medicine to quiet you. . . . They are all afraid of you.’ Her eyes filled with tears
again. ‘They’ll call to you’” (232). A loving partner as well as a maternal figure, Ts’eh
fears that “if you come quietly, they will take you and lock you in the white walls of the
hospital. But if you don’t go with them, they’ll hunt you down, and take you any way
they can. Because this is the only ending they understand.” She then wraps Tayo in love
while he “held her fiercely all night” (233). How Tayo reacts captures his gentle, tender,
and loving side. It also reveals the intensity of his desire to love and be in love. Finding
somebody whom he can feel close to awakens his emotions, re-energizes him sexually,
and affirms his sexual identity. Warm and empathic love, intimate as well as fulfilling,
touches him emotionally, is essential in restoring the emotional aspect of his self. Being
in relationship with a loving partner reassures Tayo that he is in love; to be in love means

64
to reinhabit the body and to become aware of one’s presence, one’s own sexual vitality,
and to experience the wholeness of one’s being.
But Ts’eh leaves. Before parting, she counsels Tayo to “remember what you have
seen, then nothing is gone” (231). Tayo then takes “a trail that cut directly to the cliffs”
(221). The vista reawakens his sensibility. For the first time “the sun felt good; he could
smell the juniper and piñon still damp from the rain.” And as far as “he could see . . . the
world was alive” (220). This gives him a visceral understanding of the fact that Rocky
and Uncle Josiah were “close; they had always been close. And he loved them then as he
had always loved them.” Once far beyond the ability to comprehend that “they loved
him,” now he knows that “nothing was ever lost as long as the love remained” (219-20).
In the wake of his ability to see connections that exist among the events of his life and the
world around him, “the terror of the dreaming he had done on this bed was gone,
uprooted from his belly; and the woman had filled the hollow spaces with new dreams”
(219). Better yet, he begins to understand that “There was no end to it; it knew no
boundaries; and he had arrived at the point of convergence where the fate of all living
things, and even the earth, had been laid” (245). This awareness of sharing a common
destiny with “all living things” and this discovery that all created things are interrelated
indicate that Tayo has moved towards the path of liberation from the past.
Although demanding and dangerous, the journey brings a shift in attitude, increases
Tayo’s ability for sustained thinking, and equips him with enough strength to work
through his trauma and anxieties. When he looks back in retrospection, traumatic
memories no longer consume him. While he is unable to grasp the significance of what

65
Betonie said, with the dawning of this new perspective, “he knew. . . why the oldtimers
could only speak of yesterday and tomorrow in terms of the present moment: the only
certainty; and this present sense of being was qualified with bare hints of yesterday or
tomorrow.” He now understands what Josiah meant when he said, “There are some things
worth more than money” and that “this is where we come from, see. This sand, this stone,
these trees, the vines, all the wildflowers. This earth keeps us going” (45).
An important point here is that if Tayo can be this reflective, change has occurred.
He can control his thinking, and his consciousness no longer takes whatever form it
pleases. When Tayo is responsive to nature and when he recognizes that his life takes on
meaning only in relation to it, this newfound sensitivity culminates in a renewed
existence. He comes to recognize that there can be no real difference between the
Japanese and the Laguna people because “human beings were one clan” (246). The
feeling that the world is alive and is an unending source of delight is epiphanic, an
indication that the change in him is real. At the end of the journey, Tayo arrives at a
“convergence of patterns; he could see them clearly now. . . . The transition was
completed” (254-55). The journey has altered his thinking and liberated his mind from
tyrannical memories. He now understands what Uncle Josiah meant when he said, “The
wind and the dust . . . are part of life too, like the sun and the sky” (46). He is mentally
sound now and his spirit at its finest. In an existential sense, the journey reduces the
effect of traumatic events by facilitating the articulation of his being. While the journey
was meant to be for finding the cattle, it cultivates in him the ability to be mindful as well
as to concentrate. While the need for direction and control over life that the journey calls
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from him fosters resiliency, the dignity and respect others display for him restore his selfesteem.
While healing relationships ground Tayo, the journey provides him an outlet for the
release of his emotions and the opportunity to reorient his perception. If it were not for
others as well as the journey, there would have been no transition. With a new frame of
mind and a newfound sense of coherence and energy, Tayo returns to his community.
While in the past his mind would feed on painful memories, which would lock him inside
his consciousness, Tayo is free now. Morbid and traumatic memories no longer interfere
with his ability to act rationally and drag him to delirium. As Grandmother had long
anticipated, he feels mentally at home: “Yeah, Grandma, I’m okay now” (215, 213). Such
an attitude, if judged from Krishnamurti’s perspective, suggests that Tayo can now
observe the whole of life. With his own efforts as well as the strategies and efforts others
apply for him, Tayo puts the pieces of his life together toward coherence and stability.6
Ceremony depicts how interpersonal relationships impact individual psychology.
The foundation for the articulation of the being, love and intimate connections root Tayo
ontologically and aid him in recovering his senses and regaining his self-esteem. He has
come to terms with his life and life has become meaningful. What would it mean to turn
away from relationships and recoil within the limit of his own self, as the doctors had
advised, and by what means would his healing take place? If there were no such unifying
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Johnson and Johnson argue that “from the moment we are born to the moment we die,
relationships are the core of our existence. We are conceived within relationships, are
born into relationships, and live our lives within relationships” (105).
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experiences as being in love that enhance Tayo’s sense of being and the journey that
develops his ability to observe life as a “total movement, ” he would have withdrawn into
insanity. His story demonstrates that authentic identity entails intimate relationships as
well as the how of life experiences. To be human is to be with others and to be in
relationships.

CHAPTER THREE
THE MUTUAL BASIS OF AN AUTHENTIC ONTOLOGY: SANDRA
CISNEROS’S THE HOUSE ON MANGO STREET AND MAXINE HONG
KINGSTON’S THE WOMAN WARRIOR
All living creatures come into being through other entities
like themselves. It is by others, in the plural, that any livingbody comes to exist as a living breathing entity. In this most
basic sense others are the source of my existence. . . . Both I
[and] others are that through which world is what it is, and
also, other people are one of the conditions by which I am
able to become who I am as I am one of the conditions by
which others are able to become who they are.
--Corey Anton
Who knows but that, on the lower frequencies,
I speak for you?
--Nameless protagonist in Ralph Ellison’s
Invisible Man

In the first and second chapters of this dissertation I have been discussing the
facticity of Dasein at length, revealing how it can shape, disrupt, or destroy a self’s
authentic ontology. In Morrison’s Bluest and Silko’s Ceremony, I showed that individual
identity is tied to the basic facts of one’s existence. This chapter will explore similar ideas
of the authentic identity as constituted by the nature of everyday existence in Sandra
Cisneros’s Mango Street and Maxine Hong Kingston’s Warrior. As we will see, Maxine
and Esperanza, the protagonists of these novels, devote their intellectual and emotional
resources to incorporating others into their subjective existence. Only when they reach
out, relate to others, and feel others’ pain can their selves find full articulation. While
what others say determines for them the path they will take, neither do others limit their
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aspirations nor are they themselves lost in the others. This state of being—independent
from others and yet defining choices and actions in terms of others who serve as sources
of inspiration—captures “a dialectic coexistence or mutuality of ‘opposites’ [such as]
agency and relatedness” (Kağitçibaşi 181).
A major contemporary multiethnic American novel, Cisneros’s Mango is set in the
mid-1960s in a poverty-stricken Hispanic community. Although the novel consists of a
series of anecdotes and does not follow a linear narrative pattern, the vignettes give
readers a sense of the personal growth of the novel’s protagonist Esperanza, a teenage
Mexican-American girl. When the book opens, she is shown as intimately bound with her
parents and her sibling, but embarrassed for belonging to Mango Street. Over a period of
a year, she wanders around her neighborhood taking in the stories of people of her
community, which begin to awaken within her a new compassion and sensitivity about
her community. Esperanza grows to love Mango Street and things that felt bad about it
before do not feel bad anymore. When the experiences collected open her thinking and
expand her perceptions, they keep her grounded ontologically in that her initial desire to
escape the filth and poverty of her community for an isolated and passive pursuit of selffulfillment is replaced by her promise to come back and stay for “those who cannot out”
(110).
In her study of family patterns, Çiğdem Kağitçibaşi explains that a “relational
self” emerges from a traditional family structure where there are no rigid self-other
boundaries. In the traditional form of interpersonal relationship, each individual is
intimately bonded with others both in an emotional and a material sense; everybody’s
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personal needs are subordinated to the family’s needs, and child-rearing is oriented
towards instilling family values and obligations, nurturing family loyalty, and fostering
interdependence. The primary function of this family is to foster loyalty, not
independence and interpersonal distance, and promote a sense of bonding so that the
children see themselves as a part of the family, become invested in its welfare, and
safeguard its interests.
Contrastingly, an independent self emerges out of a nuclear family, which
emphasizes individuality and self-sufficiency over obedience to the family’s well-being.
In nuclear families the “objective conditions of social welfare and difference render
family interdependence unnecessary, if not dysfunctional” (Kağitçibaşi 183). The virtue
of relationships is to pursue personal interest. Attainment of one’s personal goals and
fulfilling one’s desires are not taken as a threat to the family’s economic and emotional
health. Kağitçibaşi identifies the American middle class with this family type. Among
other relational structures, “integrative synthesis emerges in the family context of
emotional interdependence rather than in one of total interdependence or independence . .
. because in [such a family] both autonomy and closely-knit connectedness are
functional” (185). The core element of this kind of family is that an individual is free
from family obligations but is closely connected emotionally. Kağitçibaşi writes, the “self
that develops in the family model of interdependence is the relational self . . . . [T]he self
emerging in the family model of independence is the separated self [and the] self
developing in the family model of emotional interdependence is the autonomousrelational self” (183). The idea of an autonomous-relational self serves as a framework
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for discussing the type of self theorized in Mango and Warrior. Esperanza’s identity, for
instance, takes its shape out of her Latino heritage as well as through guidance given by
significant others who foster both independence and strong emotional interdependence.
And her initial desire to flee from Mango Street ultimately develops into a sense that she
is very much a part of her community and lifelong commitments to others.
Central for discussing the phenomenology of existence is the account of the
relational dynamic within the Cordero family, which is the locus of Esperanza’s
experience, her purpose, and behavior. We must then direct our attention to the
description of her family that opens Mango:
We didn’t always live on Mango Street. Before that we lived in Loomis on
the third floor, and before that we lived on Keeler. Before Keeler it was
Paulina, and before that I can’t remember. But what I remember most is
moving a lot. Each time it seemed there’d be one more of us. By the time we
got to Mango Street we were six—Mama, Papa, Carlos, Kiki, my sister
Nenny and me. . . . We had to leave the flat on Loomis quick. The water
pipes broke and the landlord wouldn’t fix them because the house was too
old. We had to leave fast. We were using the washroom next door and
carrying water over in empty milk gallons. That’s why Mama and Papa
looked for a house, and that’s why we moved into the house on Mango
Street, far away, on the other side of town. (3-4)
From the first sentence on, the point of view taken by Esperanza is all-inclusive. Her use
of the first person “we” in each sentence, with few exceptions, does not refer to her alone,
but to the entire family. The term brings everybody into a single signifier and thus
comprises multiple selves. Such an intimate reference to the family members recalls
Francisco Romero, who explains that “the notion of the ‘we’ is always relative: we, the
living human beings. . . . we, who now agree in something and feel bound by that tie”
(101). In the process of identification, expressed through the collective “we,” while
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others are perceived, the perceiver, Esperanza, is embodied in those perceived. What that
means, from a relational standpoint, is that the speaking self is not separate from others.
Esperanza does not frame her experience in isolationistic terms and refuses to create a
self-other divide by nullifying herself into others.1
For Esperanza, finding her strength involves intimate emotional attachment, which
is even more pronounced in “Hair,” where she seems engrossed in the quality of hair of
her family members. In her account, “everybody in our family has different hair. My
Papa’s hair is like a broom, all up in the air . . . But my mother’s hair, my mother’s hair,
like little rosettes, like little candy circles all curly and pretty” (6). While her father’s hair
lacks curliness, her mother’s hair is curly and pretty and “smells like bread” (7). What
Esperanza says about her family defies individualistic norms, which are heavily invested
in protecting personal information. But, from a relational perspective, what she says
presents her as a trusting and loving person. Even a cursory look at the Cordero family
brings to the fore an emotionally rich domestic environment.
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In sharp contrast to Esperanza, who focuses on her family members, Ishmael, the
narrator in Melville’s Moby Dick, focuses only on himself: “Call me Ishmael. Some time
ago—never mind how long precisely—having little or no money in my purse, and
nothing particular to interest me on shore, I thought I would sail about a little and see the
watery part of the world” (18). Holden Caulfield in The Catcher in the Rye is no less
isolated and preoccupied with himself. Also, he is defiant and disrespectful: “If you really
want to hear about it, the first thing you’ll probably want to know is where I was born,
and what my lousy childhood was like, and how my parents were occupied and all before
they had me, and all that David Copperfield kind of crap, but I don’t feel like going into
it, if you want to know the truth” (1). The contrast between Esperanza’s kind nature and
the self-serving and the condescending attitude taken by Ishmael and Holden Caulfield
cannot be overstated. Attitudinal differences among these characters reflect the ethos of
different social environments they come from.
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Just as the novel shows an emotionally supportive family, it provides equally
disquieting moments of intensity and grim wisdom. Esperanza is located in social spaces
where she witnesses significant differences of race and class. She recalls:
Once when we were living on Loomis, a nun from my school passed by and
saw me playing out front. […]
Where do you live? she asked.
There, I said pointing up to the third floor.
You live there? There. I had to look where she pointed—the third floor, the
paint peeling, wooden bars Papa had nailed on the windows so we wouldn’t
fall out. You live there? The way she said it made me feel like nothing. There.
I lived there. I nodded. (5)
James R. Giles argues that “in the eyes of the racist Anglo society, [Esperanza’s] skin
color is associated with images of dirt and secrecy” (74). As Giles suggests, the roots of
the nun’s repulsive behavior lie in the racial stereotypes she has internalized. There is no
more telling episode of the discrimination Esperanza has experienced than the one where
Sister Superior denies her a lunch because she does not live far enough away. She even
guesses the location of Esperanza’s house from her office’s window: “You don’t live far .
. . You live across the boulevard. That’s only four blocks. . . . That one? she said,
pointing to a row of ugly three-flats” (45). While the nun derides Esperanza for her
poverty, Sister Superior presumes her socioeconomic status based on her physical
appearance.
At this point it is important to recall Nilanjana Dasgupta, who explains the
reasons why people who belong to the dominant group attach importance to their identity,
make prejudicial judgments, and project negative stereotypes onto people who occupy a
minority status. According to her:
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People . . . associate race with negative roles (e.g. the homeless person, the
criminal) rather than positive ones. These negative associations are learned and
reinforced because people are typically immersed in environments where they
are more likely to see minority groups in marginalized social roles and Whites
in admired and valued social roles. As a result, when people think of
minorities, negative associations pop into mind more quickly and easily than
positive associations. (108)
The nun and Sister Superior cannot see Esperanza beyond racial stereotypes. Having
lived far from the sites of filth and poverty and everyday struggle for living, they
associate her with poverty with ease, over which she has no control. While these women
perceive her difference in stereotypical terms, paradoxical as it may sound, in failing to
recognize Esperanza on an equal footing, they provide her an opportunity to glimpse her
own identity as an other. When they construe an identity for her, she can envision
conditions that might eliminate such stereotyping. The experience of ethnic prejudice, so
to say, leads to an insight. Esperanza tells us, “I knew then I had to have a house . . . .
One I could point to” (5). The incident acquaints her with her own otherness or the
foreigner within the psyche. By recognizing the foreigner within, she will gain the ability
to accept others within her society (Kristeva, “Strangers” 1-2).
In an existential sense, the nun and Sister Superior serve as essential others,
essential to the self’s encounter with itself. As necessary determinants of the self, they
help change Esperanza’s outlook on the world. In other words, in their measurement of
her against themselves, which makes Esperanza realize her otherness, they expose the
fundamental aspect of her as an other while rendering her being visible to her. It is
precisely out of self-other dynamics as such that Esperanza’s identity emerges. There are
moments in Mango that elicit passion and commitment. At one point Esperanza reflects
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upon the possible significations of the term assigned to her, which is her name, which
leads to a discovery of her name’s association with matrilineal history:
In English my name means hope. In Spanish it means too many letters. It
means sadness, it means waiting. . . . It was my great-grandmother’s name and
now it is mine. . . . At school they say my name is funny as if the syllables
were made out of tin and hurt the roof of your mouth. But in Spanish my name
is made out of a softer something, like silver, not quite as thick as sister’s
name. . . . I would like to baptize myself under a new name, a name more like
the real me, the one nobody sees. Esperanza as Lisandra or Maritza or Zeze the
X. Yes. Something like Zeze the X will do. (11)
Readers of Mango explain this account as indicative of a desire for renaming. Julian
Olivares, for example, argues that in her examination of her name, Esperanza “traces the
reason for the discomfiture with her name to cultural oppression, the Mexican males’
suppression of their women [and] thus would like to baptize herself under a new name
not culturally embedded in a domineering, male-centered ideology” (163). While the
desire to rename, as Olivares observes, is an oppositional practice, naming has always
already foreclosed Esperanza’s ability to resignify herself. She may freely choose her
mode of being, but her name is not subject to change and is not her choice. Relevant to
this discussion is the notion that “if we are formed in language, then that formative power
precedes and conditions any decision we might make about it” (Butler 2). Subjectivity
emerges after having been instituted within a signifier, but the speaking self cannot rid
itself of the linguistic position through which it is represented. Elizabeth Wright points
out, “Like a graph that approaches zero, but never reaches it, [our] self-concept will never
match up to [our] own naming” (156). As becomes apparent from these observations,
Esperanza’s name has already allocated her a place and thus she cannot abandon her for a
new one nor can her name represent her true being.
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Esperanza may seem to want to replace her name with “Lisandra or Maritza or Zeze
the X,” but in order to be intelligible inside the symbolic system, she should be willing to
place herself in a single word, a single name. Given that her subjectivity has already been
produced for her in the very term “Esperanza,” she can neither replace her name nor can
she conceive of a nonlinguistic position. The interest in discovering the connotations of
her own name can be read as an act of bonding in that it is her very name, which is a
symbolic of the semiotic chain, that reconnects her to her matrilineal history. Represented
by the same signifier, a sign which carries similar historical and cultural connotations,
great-granddaughter and great-grandmother are part of the same sign. Again, the
contemplation upon the sign that signifies Esperanza reveals a linguistic association with
her great-grandmother more than her actual desire for resignification.
A few lines further in “My Name,” Esperanza reimagines memories of her greatgrandmother as “a wild horse of a woman, so wild she would not marry. Until my greatgrandfather threw a sack over her head and carried her off . . . she looked out the window
her whole life, the way so many women sit their sadness on an elbow” (Mango 11).
While her great-grandmother does not embody the qualities of femininity, once shackled
by the manacles of matrimony she was a prisoner of patriarchy. In the image of the
ontological fixedness of great-grandma, Esperanza discovers the limits patriarchy sets for
women. It dawns upon Esperanza that if she were to adopt her great-grandmother’s
temperamental qualities, she would wind up in a similar situation. With this
understanding, her naiveté disappears. She promises, “I don’t want to inherit her place by
the window.” While great-grandmother is dead and cannot be responsive to Esperanza in
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a physical sense, her ghostly presence functions as a source of knowledge, power, and
guidance.
Other vignettes also feature both literally and figuratively how relationships serve
as strong moral sources and shape Esperanza’s temperament and sensitivities. In “Cathy
Queen of Cats,” she befriends Cathy, who wants to be “a friend. . . . But only till
Tuesday. That’s when we move away. Got to. . . . [T]he neighborhood is getting bad”
(13). It is disheartening to hear that Cathy’s parents are leaving Mango Street because it
is getting bad. What Cathy says leads Esperanza to tears because her family had recently
moved to the community. This incident does not prevent Esperanza from seeking
friendship, however. On another occasion, she befriends Rachel and her sister Lucy, who
love her for who she is and show a genuine interest in friendship. Negligent of class and
color and nonjudgmental in nature, the sisters accept her and “don’t laugh” when she tells
them her name (15).
The girls ask Esperanza for her help in collecting money so that they can buy a
bike. The success of their plan rests on what she chooses to do. But, impressed by their
warmth and good intentions, Esperanza runs to her house: “I have three dollars saved and
I take two of Nenny’s. She’s not home, but I’m sure she’ll be glad when she finds out we
own a bike” (15). She agrees to “ride it together.” Esperanza places importance on the
happiness of both instead of her own. In an individualistic culture, where personal
behaviors are regularized and emotional life, to borrow from Clifford Geertz, is thinned
out through etiquette, so that his or her “outer behavior appears to others as . . .
predictable, undisturbing, [and] elegant,” the resolve to take the money without her

78
sister’s consent may be considered as theft (33). If we bring in the idea of etiquette, we
will miss the intrinsic honesty and deep love Esperanza has for her sister. When she
forms an idea of her sister, reflects on her actions, and foresees her sister’s happiness
over what she has done, taking on her identity and living in her life temporarily, she
identifies with her sister ontologically.
These girls bond in a single act of riding the bike and prioritize common over
personal interests. They jump rope together, sing songs, and learn how to “cross and
uncross our legs” (40) without any sense of ownership. When they walk in high heels
around the neighborhood, it draws men’s attention. A bum, for example, praises Rachel
for her shoes: “Yes, little girl. Your little lemon shoes are so beautiful. But come closer. I
can’t see very well. Come closer. Please” (41). In what he says, the man conceives the
shoes as objects of sexual excitement and constructs Rachel’s identity in sexual terms: “If
I give you a dollar will you kiss me?” (42). The gaze of the others makes the girls aware
of their burgeoning sexuality, evident in them getting “tired of being beautiful.” The
spirit of solidarity of these girls that is characterized by equity, reciprocity, and mutual
regard pushes the self-other boundaries.
During her excursion around the neighborhood, Esperanza encounters women
wronged by patriarchy. With the terror of what she witnesses, she comes to understand
the intricacies involving language, gender, and identity. In “No Speak English,”
Esperanza gives an account of a Hispanic mother, Mamacita, who has recently arrived
from Mexico and barely speaks English: “He not here for when the landlord comes, No
speak English if anybody else comes, and Holy smokes” (77). The migration from a rural
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village in Mexico to a barrio in a megalopolis such as Chicago may be materially
fulfilling, but Mamacita soon finds herself living a life of misery. Her inability to
converse in English has caged her within the walls of her house, changing her dream for a
better life into disappointment. In the throes of loneliness, “she sits all day by the window
and plays the Spanish radio show and sings all the homesick songs of her country in a
voice that sounds like a seagull.” Just as Mamacita is stuck at home, Rafaela, another
member of the Mango community, has become a prisoner of patriarchy. Fearing that she
“will run away [because] she is too beautiful to look at,” her husband decrees that she
stay home. Having been forced to live in a reality of his making, Rafaela “leans out the
window and leans on her elbow.” In a disquieting scene, Rafaela is seen dropping down a
bill to neighborhood children pleading with them to buy coconut and papaya juice for
her.
Among other accounts of female victimization is Sally. She is a girl with “eyes like
Egypt” but is confined to her home by her cruel father because he once saw “her talking
to a boy” (93). Fearing that she will “run away like his sisters,” which meant disgrace to
the family, he forces her to quit school. Sally has enough of the terror at home to realize
the importance of freedom. In order to escape her fate, she marries a “marshmallow
salesman” (101). But, like Tereus, Sally’s husband does not allow her to “talk on the
telephone. And he does not let her look out the window” (102).2 It is possible to speculate
that Sally might have hoped that marriage would give her life purpose and direction, but
her husband takes away her freedom and forces her to his own will, thereby turning her
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According to the Greek legend, king of Thrace, Tereus seduces his wife’s sister
Philomela and then pierces her tongue to hide his crime from revelation (“Tereus”).
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into an exile. What is unnerving is that, as much as Sally acts on her desire, she is merely
transferred from the hands of “a beastly father” into the hands of “a fatherly beast” (Rose
223).
A witness of women who are “trapped within the frontiers of [their] body”
(Kristeva, “New” 296), Esperanza comes to grasp the grim reality in which she will be
positioned and confined if she were to succumb to the patriarchal ideology. The sight of
women who are bereft of voice except to serve their male counterparts begets a pledge
“not to grow up tame like the others who lay their necks on the threshold waiting for the
ball and chain. . . . I have begun my own quiet war. Simple. Sure. I am one who leaves
the table like a man, without putting back the chair or picking up the plate” (89). The
promise not to submit to male patronage and to conform to the patriarchal ideal sheds a
light on how the self incorporates lived experiences into its own being.
Other vignettes show different bases of experiences that provide Esperanza an
opportunity to perceive and experience herself and her community differently. In “Born
Bad,” she attends her aunt Lupe who is not only lost in the dismal shadows of a “disease
that would not go” (59) but also dying. While Esperanza comforts her with stories and
poems, Aunt Lupe “listens to every book, every poem I read her.” She urges Esperanza,
“You must keep writing. It will keep you free,” thus planting seeds of a writerly soul.
Esperanza is too young to recognize the value of writing because “at that time I didn’t
know what she meant.” Later, what her aunt admires in her arouses Esperanza’s interest
in writing; writing, an inspiration from her aunt, becomes her vocation. In “The Four
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Skinny Trees,” the realm of nature has a nurturing effect on Esperanza. In a quasimystical manner she muses:
The Trees are the only ones who understand me. I am the only one who
understands them. Four skinny trees with skinny necks and pointed elbows like
mine. Four who do not belong here but are here. . . . Their strength is secret.
They send ferocious roots beneath the ground. They grow up and they grow
down and grab the earth between their hairy toes and bite the sky with violent
teeth and never quit their anger. This is how they keep. Let one forget his reason
for being, they’d all droop like tulips in a glass, each with their arms around the
other. Keep, keep, keep, trees say when I sleep. (74)
The trees feel not only her emotion but also confer dignity on her. As Esperanza reflects
on the trees, it increases her awareness of their will to persist despite the extremity of the
situation, which animates her spirit and encourages her to fight and be triumphant. An
intimate frame of reference, the trees become her breath and spirit. Moreover, the
telepathy between Esperanza and the trees affirms not only the oneness between them but
also their destiny, which brings us back to the idea of entering into meaningful
relationships, which can also involve the realm of nature. When she bestows love on the
trees and holds them in high esteem as if they are her own family members, she extends
her existentiality to a symbolic avenue of the intrapersonal. Esperanza can now view life
from the perspective of the trees and know why it is necessary to “keep, keep, keep.”
The account in “The Three Sisters” bears a surprising resemblance to “The Four
Skinny Trees.” Like the trees, the level of trust and mutuality the sisters show Esperanza
and the intimacy they value are moving. According to Esperanza, one of the sisters with
“marble hands” calls her aside to say:
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When you leave you must remember to come back for the others. A circle,
understand? You will always be Esperanza. You will always be Mango Street.
You can’t erase what you know. You can’t forget who you are.
Then I didn’t know what to say. It was as if she could read my mind, as if
she knew what I had wished for, and I felt ashamed for having made such a
selfish wish.
You must remember to come back. For the ones who cannot leave as
easily as you. You will remember? She asked as if she was telling me. Yes,
yes, I said. (105)
What most concerns us here is the moral significance of the message conveyed by the
sisters, for the message not only links Esperanza to Mango Street but also shows the
futility of her freedom in its absence. Quite a while ago Esperanza wanted to flee Mango
Street, but she is now ashamed of her “selfish wish.” What the sister says changes her
perceptions about Mango Street, for it was not so apparent until now how deeply her
being is embedded within the world of Mango Street. When the message touches her
soul, Esperanza attains new sensibility and her frustrations and anxieties associated with
her community transform into a sense of belonging: “One day I will pack my bags of
books and paper. One day I will say goodbye to Mango. I am too strong for her to keep
me here forever. One day I will go away. . . . They will not know that I have gone away
to come back. For the ones I left behind. For the ones who cannot out” (110). As this
pledge suggests, individual identity is shaped and altered by relations, for what others say
provides Esperanza direction and delivers her to thought. She may leave her community,
but an integral part of her being, she will not be rid of it. In her change of heart and her
pledge to return, convergence takes place between Esperanza and her community.
While Esperanza is awakened from the illusion of a self-satisfying goal into the
reality of her being, Felicia Cruz claims that “the last four paragraphs of the final vignette
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insinuate that the primary focus has been or is, actually, Esperanza [in that] although
memories of Mango Street are still present, it is made clear that it is she who ultimately
has the upper hand; Esperanza controls Mango Street” (932). One difficulty with this
reading is the creation of a hierarchy of a winner and a loser and the idea of control, as if
Mango Street is a territory to be reigned over. Cruz bases her reading in lines where
Esperanza says, “I am too strong for [Mango Street] to keep me here forever. She does
not hold me with both arms. She sets me free’” (Mango 110). We cannot dislocate
Esperanza from her existential milieu and explain her “life course without reference to
any social or historical context, as something that occurs in isolated individuals” (Bellah
et al. 82). In her desire to glorify the individual, Cruz applies an individualistic approach
while overlooking the existential significance of others. But to attribute power to
Esperanza is to be disingenuous to Mango Street, particularly her parents, her aunts, and
the people of her community.
It is worth pointing out that the condition of departure is tied to an eventual return.
Esperanza may go away but she promises to come back. After all, the journey, to use
Jacques Derrida’s terms, is an “aller-retour [or] ‘to-go return’” (Post Card xv), where the
act of going cannot be stopped, but the traveller never arrives at a location other than
Mango Street. The idea of returning, namely rerouting the journey, makes the originary
place a final destination with Esperanza as the traveler its permanent inhabitant. That is to
say, the ideality of her intention, which is embedded in the pledge, characterizes the
journey as circular, creating a link between departure and arrival and between leaving and
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returning. A traveler Esperanza may be, but she never reaches elsewhere because the
ghostly presence of Mango Street becomes a cause of her desire for return.3
Another of the most inspiring moments is Esperanza’s encounter with Alicia. For
much like the Three Sisters and Aunt Lupe, Alicia says that “like it or not you are Mango
Street, and one day you’ll come back too” (107). From what Alicia and the Three Sisters
say, what Esperanza can be or become rests upon connection coexisting within memory
and action, the act of remembrance and the act of returning. In contrast to people who
grow up in a cultural context that inculcates the idea of personal choice and promotes
sharp self-other boundaries, Alicia, Aunt Lupe, and the Three Sisters’ love and faith in
her deepen her consciousness about who she is and help establish in her a new type of
being. She responds to their wishes and identifies with obligations and expectations they
have for her; she begins to see Mango Street from their viewpoint, which leads to a
realization that ignoring her community is ignoring herself, an ontological suicide. Her
community holds more meaning for her now than ever. That is why she commits to come
back to her community in order to give voice to its needy and neglected, a new ethical
framework for her life.
Julio Serrano says that Esperanza’s growth toward authenticity “requires the
confrontation between her Mexican heritage and the new possibilities offered by the
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In Specters of Marx Jacques Derrida uses haunting/hauntology to refer to a nonreality or
a nonbeing, which he characterizes as ghostly. However, I use the term “haunt” here to
refer to Mango Street’s effect on Esperanza. Mango Street haunts Esperanza because it
absent-presently dictates her will, inducing a strong desire for return, which necessitates
rerouting her journey to its point of origin, which is Mango Street.
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Anglo world” so as to “transcend her place and her culture” (102, 104). Serrano leaves us
struck when he dislocates Esperanza from her existential context. His critical perspective
echoes Cruz’s because it too is influenced by the Western philosophical tradition,
“Western psychologies that locate the determinants of human behavior within the human
psyche” (Marsella ix), whose “core operative assumptions,” Tod Sloan argues, are
“individualism and scientism” (39). Cruz and Serrano attribute personal growth to
internal individual causes but in so doing they overlook her debt to others who confer
trust and honor on her, which helps develop her faith in herself, modifies her motive, and
derails her from her self-interest. It is difficult to explain her life story without thinking
about her goal for her community, for her authentic ontology is contingent upon her
return to Mango Street and feeling her way into the subjective experience of others.
In her depiction of Esperanza, Cisneros captures how the attitude we develop for
ourselves and the world grows out of the way we experience the world, which recalls
Risieri Frondizi, who points out that personal growth does not depend upon “any obscure
or hidden substantial core, but . . . upon what [the individual] does, has done, proposes to
do, or is able to do” (113). True, social experiences permeate Esperanza’s emotion,
organize her subjectivity, grant it coherence, and integrate her psyche into her
community. Her authentic identity is “not an expression of,” Frondizi would say, her
“self but the very stuff which constitutes it.” While Esperanza is her own person,
someone who can choose her vocation, her authentic selfhood involves what she
experiences, which is her sense of belonging; what she does, which is making
connections; and what she plans to do, which is writing about her community.
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At this point it is worth noting that not only does Esperanza stand for others and
give herself over to a shared calling, she takes charge of her own existence. However, she
is not immersed in the “they.” In other words, although Esperanza has the ability to set
the course of her life, her interest does not stray from communal interest. As others
express and Esperanza realizes, she must return to Mango Street, give witness to its
poverty, bring her people into the system of signification through writing, people who do
not exist in the cultural imaginary of the dominant order. The investment of her hope in
and through writing gives Esperanza agency and by extension voice and power to the
people of Mango Street as well. Writing, which is attributed to others and contains
aspects of them, becomes an aspect of her authentic ontology. In an existential sense, the
family and social circumstances provide Esperanza basic orientation. It is through
everyday experiences that she learns to know herself and learns to know that her feelings
are etched into Mango Street. And as long as Mango Street exists, which it does and will,
it always exists as a locus of her self, which is shaped by its relational context and is
wedded to it.
Authenticity is not the enemy of demands that emanate
from beyond the self; it supposes such demands.
--Charles Taylor
Unless I see her life branching into mine, [my
nameless aunt] gives me no ancestral help.
--Maxine in Warrior

A similar theme of the significance of others as a constituent of the self’s authentic
ontology is emphasized in Maxine Hong Kingston’s The Woman Warrior. An immense
success after its publication, this memoir is a collection of stories of women who serve as
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emotional anchors to Maxine’s being. In Maxine we see the phenomenon of personal
growth as involving the everyday being of a self and its affectional relationships. Her
selfhood is rooted in acting and working for a greater cause and thus bears a strong
resemblance to Esperanza, who also comes from a multicultural background and defines
herself in terms of writing stories of the suffering and endurance of her significant others.
Similar to Esperanza, the construction of Maxine’s authentic identity involves the
branching out of her self to embrace others in her community as well as the convergence
of their identities, emotions, and spirits within her.
In the first section of Warrior Maxine, for example, feels the pain of her “nameless”
Chinese aunt who was left in oblivion for years for violating a sexual taboo by bearing
the child of her lover while her husband was overseas. Maxine recalls her mother binding
her to secrecy before she tells the story of her aunt:
“You mustn’t tell anyone,” my mother said, “what I am about to tell you. In
China your father had a sister who killed herself. She jumped into the family
well. We say that your father has all brothers because it is as if she had never
been born . . . . I remember looking at your aunt one day when she and I were
dressing; I had not noticed before that she had such a protruding melon of a
stomach. But I didn’t think, “She’s pregnant,” until she began to look like
other pregnant women, her shirt pulling and the white tops of her black pants
showing. She could not have been pregnant, you see, because her husband
had been gone for years. No one said anything. We did not discuss it. . . .
Don’t let your father know that I told you. He denies her.” (11, 13)
While her parents and her relatives want to bury the aunt in China in anonymity,
Maxine’s conscience tells her that to keep ignoring her aunt constitutes a great wrong.
She understands that she must retrieve her story and transform her silence into voice:
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“My aunt haunts me—her ghost is drawn to me because now, after fifty years of neglect,
I alone devote pages of paper to her” (22). Maxine owes her aunt a debt of love.
In her first act of memory, Maxine brings her aunt to existence through writing. To
give her aunt personality as one who could act on her desire, Maxine invents memories
about her aunt’s pregnancy from a number of vantage points, speculating that she could
just as easily have been a passionate seductress as a victim of rape: “My aunt could not
have been the lone romantic who gave up everything for sex. Women in the old China
did not choose. Some man had commanded her to lie with him and be his secret evil. I
wonder whether he masked himself when he joined the raid on her family” (14). Maxine
grants her aunt moral agency, speculating that she was a possible rape victim. The
speculation not only defends her honor but also protects her from charges that she must
be a careless seductress. Maxine further speculates that her aunt “kept the man’s name to
herself throughout her labor and dying; she did not accuse him that he be punished with
her. To save her inseminator’s name she gave silent birth” (18). In imagining her aunt in
these terms, Maxine grants her power as an individual who could flout social conventions
and refuse to accuse her seducer by revealing his name. Maxine’s aunt has the courage to
take the blame on herself, a heroic act.
Maxine next renders her aunt’s newborn in realistic terms: “Full of milk, the little
ghost slept” (21). “When [the baby] awoke,” her aunt then “hardened her breasts against
the milk that crying loosens. Towards morning she picked up the baby and walked to the
well. . . . Carrying the baby to the well shows loving. Otherwise abandon it. Turn its face
into the mud. Mothers who love their children take them along.” In order to prevent the
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child from ever enduring misery, the aunt commits infanticide. If the baby were to
survive it would suffer shame and humiliation. By bringing the body of her aunt (kept
“under seal”) into the world of signification, Maxine gives her aunt both the breath and
speech that were taken away from her. Cixous is right to observe: “Censor the body [and]
you censor breath and speech at the same time” (880). The act of writing her aunt into
being recognizes her sovereignty as a speaking subject. In Helene Cixous’s terms,
Maxine “must . . . write about women and bring women to writing from which they have
been driven away as violently as from their bodies” (875). When Maxine constructs the
image of her aunt as a being with flesh and desire and treats her body as an integral part
of her text, she immerses herself with her aunt inside a world of signification. Both
Maxine and her aunt exist within language where they become part of the other’s being.
The nameless aunt must now be heard.
From the fate of her no-name aunt, Maxine learns that the patriarchal ideal of female
virtue is suffocating. What she needs is to develop a warrior-like identity for herself, an
identity that will give her the power to fight against the limitations imposed by a genderbiased patriarchal system. In order for that, she emulates a Chinese mythical warrior, Fa
Mu Lan. Maxine tells us:
I would be a little girl of seven the day I followed the bird away into the
mountains. The brambles would tear off my shoes and the rocks cut my feet
and fingers, but I would keep climbing, eyes upward to follow the bird. . . .
The two old people led me in exercises that began at dawn and ended at sunset
so that I could watch our shadows grow and shrink and grow again, rooted to
the earth. I learned to move my fingers, hands, feet, head, and entire body in
circles. (Warrior 29)
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Maxine follows the bird to the mountains that were “like the tops of […] dragons’
heads,” studies art, and performs complex cognitive tasks (33). She puts herself in the
place of the mythical warrior and despite excruciating pain emulates the gestures and
rhythms of its body. In order to measure her ability to endure physical suffering, Maxine
then walks “heel down first, toes pointing outward thirty to forty degrees, making the
ideograph ‘eight,’ making the ideograph ‘human.’ Knees bent, I would swing into the
slow, measured square step,’ the powerful walk in the battle.” She stays until she is “big
enough and more skillful” (36).
When Maxine can “point at the sky and make a sword appear . . . and control its
slashing with my mind” (37), she comes home. Upon her return, she fights against
oppression. In her first mission, she vents her anger upon the thieves who took the
harvest (28) and the tyrant, the emperor: “We faced our emperor personally. We
beheaded him, cleaned out the palace, and inaugurated the peasant who would begin the
new order” (45). Maxine next slays a baron: “I walked about like a guest until I found the
baron. I […] ripped off my shirt to show him my back. ‘You are responsible for this.’
When I saw his startled eyes at my breasts, I slashed him across the face and on the
second stroke cut off his head” (45-46). The reprisal against injustice aimed at restoring
the insulted dignity of the Chinese peasants is an original way of being and is guided by
the ideal of the well-being of all. We should also note that when Maxine reinvents her
identity in the image of the mythical warrior, she rejects Chinese cultural mores that force
girls into traditional feminine roles of submissive wives and dutiful daughters.
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Maxine invests her energy in attending to others by writing about them,
empowering them, and giving them voice. There are numerous ways that she enters into
relationship through writing, and perhaps not the least significant is her own mother, the
fictional account of whom appears in “Shaman,” the third section of Warrior. In
Maxine’s account, her mother, Brave Orchid, was known as a lady scholar in China who
“could find descriptions of phenomena in ancient writings—the Greek Phoenix stories,
‘The Seven Strange Tales of the Golden Rottle,’ What Confucius Did Not Talk About”
(64). Brave Orchid once defended her colleagues who were terrified by a rumor of a
ghost haunting the college. It is not surprising that her name is associated with a Chinese
shaman who can identity good and bad spirits and rescue people in trouble. While her
classmates fear for their lives, Brave Orchid prepares for the impending danger: “I will
go and sleep in the ghost room. Then if anything happens, I won’t miss it. I hope I’ll be
able to recognize the ghost when I see it” (65). In order to confront the terrifying ghost
and destroy its shadowy presence in the school halls, Brave Orchid prepares for a battle:
“‘You will not win, Boulder,’ she spoke to the ghost. ‘You do not belong here […] You
made a mistake haunting a medical school. . . . I do not give in. There is no pain you can
inflict that I cannot endure. You’re wrong if you think I’m afraid of you. . . . Yes when I
get my oil, I will fry you for breakfast’” (68-69).
What impresses us here is Brave Orchid’s selfless nature. The motive behind the risk
she bears is pure love. After she defeats the ghost she summons her colleagues for an
exorcising ritual. Not only is Brave Orchid courageous but also loving and
compassionate:
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In America my mother has eyes as strong as boulders, never once skittering
off a face, […] she has not learned to place decorations and phonograph
needles, nor has she stopped seeing land on the other side of the oceans. Now
her eyes include the relatives in China, as they once included my father
smiling and smiling in his many western outfits. (59)
Eyes as strong as boulders, Brave Orchid never stops “seeing land on the other side of the
oceans,” which suggests how much she cares about her Chinese relatives. Although she is
in a position of freedom and comfort in an individualistic culture of the West, the “land
on the other side of the oceans” reminds her of memories of relatives left in China. When
she reminiscences about her people who live a life of drudgery, melancholy overwhelms
her being. She refuses to turn away from the “face[s].”
Maxine gives voice to others, expressed through writing, which is essential in
attaining her own voice. In “At the Western Palace,” she gives voice to another of her
aunts, Moon Orchid, who experiences separation, descends into madness in the
individuated lifestyle of the West, and eventually dies. Her story echoes the fate of the
nameless aunt and is of particular interest from the perspective of this discussion. Like
the nameless aunt, she too lacks intimate emotional connection. Forced to stay in China
because of harsh immigration policies of the United States, Moon Orchid could not join
her husband for some time. In the absence of a loving partner, she must have suffered
lonesomeness. As Carl Rogers points out, the sources of our ability to have control over
life lie in relationships, and in their absence we do not feel quite at home.4 A self that is
not at home, Moon Orchid’s longing was fed by the void of loneliness. Starved for
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Carl Rogers argues that “when there is no relationship in which we are able to
communicate . . . then we feel the loneliness of not being in real touch with any human
being” (94).
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intimacy, when isolation raised its head, the pangs of separation began to eat away her
soul.
Moon Orchid’s miserable life touches the soul of Brave Orchid, who makes
sacrifices to get her to America, hoping that it will save her marriage and revitalize her
life. Arriving in a culture that values individuality, Moon Orchid struggles to stand alone
and intuitively wants intimacy: “She followed her nieces and nephews about. She went
over them. ‘Now she is taking a machine off the shelf. She attaches two metal spiders to
it. She plugs in the cord. She cracks an egg against the rim and pours the yolk and white
out of the shell into the bowl’” (128). Self-indulgent, her nieces and nephews do not step
out of the boundary of their selves to understand her plight. Instead, they beg, “‘Aunt,
please take your finger out of the batter.’ Moon Orchid repeated as she turned to follow
another niece walking through the kitchen. ‘Now what’s this one doing? Why she’s
sewing a dress. She’s going to try it on.’ Moon Orchid, who could not be alone, would
walk right into the children’s rooms while they were dressing” (128). Out of desperation
for emotional intimacy, she “hovered over a child who was reading, and she pointed at
certain words, ‘What’s that?’ she tapped at a section that somebody had underlined or
annotated” (122). Sequestered in their own private world, the children distance
themselves from their aunt and “made no conversation.”
Grown up in a communal cultural context, Moon Orchid could not realize that what
she does is offensive to her nieces and nephews. Exclusively concerned with themselves,
they don’t respond when she “stroked their poor white hair . . . tugged at their sleeves and
poked their shoulders and stomachs . . . [i]t was as if she were seeing how much it took to
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provoke a savage” (123). In her desperate attempt to draw their attention, “she crept up
behind them with a comb and tried to comb their hair . . . but they shook their heads, and
turned and fixed her with those eyes” (122). Despite her loving attitude and good
intentions, the children do not show any sensitivity towards her feelings. In sleep “the
young, raging one, growled . . . ‘Leave me alone’” (122). She cannot awake the children
from apathy. Engrossed in themselves, they misconstrue her behavior as annoying:
“‘She’s driving me nuts!’ the children told each other in English” (129). The narrator
notes that the “children had no feelings and no memory” (107). Indeed, plagued by the
idea of a quiet and undisturbed life, the children ignore Moon Orchid and retreat within
the insulated sphere of their own selves.
Morally sensitive and kind, Brave Orchid tries to bond Moon Orchid with her
husband. But, emotionally fragile, Moon Orchid feels out of place in America and finds it
hard to face her husband: “Oh let’s turn back. I don’t want to see him. Suppose he throws
me out? Oh he will. He’ll throw me out. And he’ll have a right to throw me out, coming
here, disturbing him, not waiting for him to invite me. Don’t leave me by myself. You
can talk louder than I can” (131). When Moon Orchid meets her husband, he expresses
his discontentment over her having come to the United States: “‘You,’ he said. ‘What are
you doing here?’ . . . ‘Why are you here?’ he asked, eyes wide. Moon Orchid covered her
face with one hand and motioned no with the other” (138). While in China she must have
felt that she still mattered, so now she is surprised by his sudden lack of interest in her.
As an indirect strategy to end their relationship, he begins to mock her social skills:
“‘Look at her. She’d never fit into an American household. I have important American
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guests who come inside my house to eat.’ He turned to Moon Orchid, ‘You can’t talk to
them. You can barely talk to me’” (139).
For Moon Orchid, her husband was the only hope while she was in China but now
she faces the frightening reality that he wants an exit from their marital relationship. The
brief encounter does no more than intensify her sense of alienation further, which is
psychologically disturbing. Hurt by a husband who rejects her and cares only for his own
personal happiness, she feels emotionally wounded. Without any relational moorings to
her soul, she loses her sense of reality. The terror of loneliness invades her being,
comprising her ability to act on her own perceptions: “The next odd thing Moon Orchid
did was to cry whenever anyone left the house. She held onto them, pulled at their
clothes, begged them not to go. The children and Brave Orchid’s husband had to sneak
out. ‘Don’t let them go,’ pleaded Moon Orchid, ‘They will never come back”’ (143). And
soon, paranoid and morbidly afraid of loneliness and in absence of vital emotional
connections, Moon Orchid loses her sanity and dies in a mental hospital.
Maxine weaves the stories of her mother and aunts and mythical warriors in order
to create her authentic identity. She also recounts her own sense of being raised in a
bicultural and bilingual context. The final section of Warrior guides readers through the
remaining portion of her coming-of-age story, particularly her transition from early
childhood years of silence to adulthood years of voice and strength. It is here that she
looks back into the distant past in an attempt to locate the sources of her voice and
individual power. Among her early childhood recollections, the most memorable one is
the account of her inarticulateness: “My silence was thickest—total—during the three
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years that I covered my school paintings with black paint. I painted layers of black over
houses and flowers and suns, and when I drew on the blackboard, I put a layer of chalk
on top” (149). The sources of her authentic self also lie in her encounters with the
significant others, such as her friends. For example, Maxine recalls her abusive
confrontation with a quiet Chinese-American girl in the school bathroom thus: “I looked
right at her [and] said, ‘I was walking past your house when you didn’t know that I was
there. I heard you yell in English and in Chinese. . . . You were saying, ‘Where are you?’
Say that again. Go ahead, just the way you did at home” (160). Alone together, Maxine
then “yanked harder on [her] hair, but steadily, not jerking… ‘“Go ahead. Say, ‘Where
are you?’ Say it loud enough for your sister to come. Call her. Make her come help you.”’
Maxine wants her silent Chinese-American classmate to speak up and to stand up for
herself and by extension herself. Paradoxically speaking, the motivational base of her
raging fury against her Chinese friend is the girl’s shyness, and in turn, her own, for her
shyness mirrors Maxine’s own nervousness. And in an insane desperation of exorcising
the demon of her silence and to find her inner strength, Maxine assaults the defenseless
girl.
Maxine brings others to incorporate into the texture of her being. Writing, myths,
and memories interweave aunts, mothers, and mythical warriors into a tapestry of her
being. Her authentic identity, which is woven out of a web of relationships, is a loom on
which all other selves are interwoven. With others as anchors to her self, Maxine reaches
a state where she can take control of her own destiny: “I’d have to storm across China to
take back our farm from the Communists; I’d have to rage across the United States to
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take back the laundry in New York and the one in California. Nobody in history has
conquered and united both North America and Asia” (50). Maxine has now the audacity
to take risks and ravage across continents, which suggests that her growth towards
authentic selfhood is complete. She can now rewrite the story started by her mother:
“Here is the story my mother told me, not when I was young, but recently, when I told
her I also am a story-talker. The beginning is hers, the ending is mine” (184).
While Maxine’s authentic ontology is a phenomenon of an active identification
with her community and traditions both Eastern and Western, James Hijiya argues that
“this daughter of Chinese immigrants to California shows ethnicity as a burden which
must and can be discarded” (554-55). Surprising here is Hijiya’s dismissal of ethnic
heritage as a burden, as if it is both irrelevant and disposable, but it is difficult to account
for Maxine’s life story without explaining the richness of her knowledge of Chinese
intellectual history. Her identity is grounded in both Chinese and American cultural
traditions and cannot be understood without attending to the contingent facts of family,
friends, and myths. Among other Cisneros scholars, Patsy Daniels does not recognize the
existential significance of others. She goes so far as to say that Maxine has to “reach back
into cultural legends to find strong women she can emulate in order to gain a voice and
become a speaking subject. Because her own mother seems to have accepted the notion
that females are not valuable, she provides little nurturing for her daughter and certainly
no overt example of how Maxine can make her way in the dominant culture” (81).
Although Daniels does not give any credit to Brave Orchid, according to Maxine, her
mother was a rebel in China:
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“I do not give in,” she said. “There is no pain you can inflict that I cannot
endure. You’re wrong if you think I’m afraid of you. You’re no mystery to
me. I’ve heard of you Sitting Ghosts before. Yes, people have lived to tell
about you. You kill babies, you cowards. You have no power over a strong
woman. You are no more dangerous than a nestling cat. My dog sits on my
feet more heavily than you can. You think this is suffering?” (Warrior 68)
It is worth emphasizing that this passage reflects the tremendous reserve of courage and
strength of Brave Orchid, who resisted injustices as well as the dogmatism of gender and,
like the mythical warrior Fa Mu Lan, fought against a ghost in China. She is an exemplar
of a moral guide. A precociously bright student, in American schools Maxine earns
straight A’s, which is almost hereditary in its resonance in that her mother had a
“reputation for being brilliant, a natural . . . lady scholar” (Warrior 61, 62). Brave Orchid
must have accepted some of the Chinese ways of life, but the heroism she displays in the
Chinese school dormitory, her scholarship, and the harsh struggle she endured in the
United States in building a world in which to raise her children with pride cannot be
ignored.
As we saw, Maxine’s identity emerges from the existential-relational field and
exists at the confluence of multiple beings: “We belong to the planet now, Mama. Does it
make sense to you that if we’re no longer attached to one piece of land, we belong to the
planet?” (99). A person whose soul is shaped by myths, maternal figures, and history,
Maxine defines herself in terms of her duty to others. As is her mother, Brave Orchid is
guided by a “core value of benevolence” (Hwang 10039), so too is Maxine. Her morality
is based on the ethics of care and social obligation: “What I’ll inherit someday is a green
address book full of names. I’ll send the relatives money, and they’ll write me stories
about their hunger. . . . I’ve been making money: I guess it’s my turn” (Warrior 184).
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Like her mother, Maxine is aware of the back-breaking peasant drudgery of her Chinese
relatives. Her morality is based on responsibility, which is writing down the names and
addresses of her relatives, sending them money, and writing about them.
Reminiscent of Esperanza, who has ordered her life on principles of sympathy and
benevolence, coming back to Mango Street to seek justice for the members of her
community, Maxine’s morality is grounded in sympathetic identification with her
Chinese relatives whose peasant drudgery has become a permanent feature in her mind.
These two female protagonists measure the significance of their lives not in terms of what
individualistic tradition grants a person as a separate and unique being seeking personal
happiness, but in terms of self-sacrifices for others. Others constitute the epistemology of
their selves and their ethical base is not “me” and “mine,” but “we” and “ours.” While
relationships root their selves, nurture in them an empathic attitude, experiences expand
their knowledge base and give them wisdom. They are a part of their community and
writing about it gives direction and meaning to their lives. In situating their characters
within family and social contexts and privileging interpersonal bonds as constitutive of an
authentic ontology, Cisneros and Kingston advance the idea of an individual as being a
part of the larger whole, the community. In sharp contrast to what Kitayama and Marcus
call “monolithic” individualistic ideology of the West that represses other indigenous
self-psychologies (224), Cisneros and Kingston espouse “a form of individualism that is
fulfilled in community rather than against it” (Bellah et al. 162). This is why Esperanza
and Maxine place others at the center of the epistemology of their selves.
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In contrast to Western individualistic ethics that privilege the self over community
and put tremendous pressure on what Robert Bellah and his colleagues call a person’s
ability to “become one’s own person, almost to give birth to oneself, [which] involves
breaking free from family, community, and inherited ideas” (82-83), as if autonomy
conflicts with connections, Maxine and Esperanza bring their own sense of freedom to
bear on bonds they forge with others. While they listen to the call of their consciences,
they place emphasis on interpersonal relationships and listen to what others have to say.
Maxine and Esperanza do not think of themselves as separate and independent entity ties
but as interdependent with others and find self-satisfaction is an unsatisfactory ideal or
substitute for intimate connection. They have transcended their egos and are liberated
from the trapping of “lonely” individualism. For them, personal quest is not their destiny;
rather; communal good is their destiny. What so deeply satisfies them is not fulfilling
their personal desire, but their sensitivity to and commitments for others. To them, being
a person involves reflecting not only on the source of the calling but also on what it calls
on them to do. Maxine and Esperanza find authenticity purchased by the ideal of
individualism as hollow for a lack of a larger purpose. For the lack of a cause larger than
themselves means the lack of the entire existential reality into which they are born and
are grounded ontologically. By virtue of their being in the world, they are woven into
connections, and in the absence of a larger quest concerning others, their authentic
selfhood has no locus of origin and no meaning.

CHAPTER FOUR
EXISTENTIAL SPATIALITY AND THE ENIGMA OF THE SELF-IN-EXILE:
BHARATI MUKHERJEE’S JASMINE
To be means to be for another, and through the other,
for oneself. A person has no internal sovereign
territory, he is wholly and always on the boundary;
looking inside himself, he looks into the eyes of
another or with the eyes of another.
--Mikhail Bakhtin
I believe . . . there are no self-made persons.
There are only those who cannot (or refuse to)
acknowledge their debts.
--V. F. Cordova

While multiethnic novels form a common ground in their exploration of existential
aspects of everyday events in the constitution of an authentic being, the idea that others
define the self and enable it to pursue freedom and autonomy is nowhere more telling
than in Bharati Mukherjee’s Jasmine (1989). If we explore the particulars of existence of
its titular character, we find that her aspiration for freedom is contingent upon
relationships that transcend national boundaries and stretch between Asia and North
America. When factual existence forces Jasmine to alter her decision and change
direction in her life, relationships provide assurance and inspire strength in her.
Set in the backdrop of a war-torn Punjab, India, and the United States, Jasmine
revolves around its title character, a girl from rural India. Jasmine is the seventh of nine
children of a poor farmer who could not afford “[o]il for clay lamps” (44). This explains
why Jasmine’s mother attempts to murder her at an early age to spare her from the misery
of being a dowryless bride (40). When Jasmine had barely turned thirteen, her paternal
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grandmother, Dida, proposes her to a Ludhiana widower who is looking for a “new wife”
to look after his three children (48). An advocate of patriarchy, who thinks it useless to
educate girls because they are supposed to be “good” housewives, Dida would “make a
fuss about [Jasmine] staying on in school” (47). Jasmine’s mother could not voice her
objections because she too thought that the marriage would guarantee her daughter “a
comfortable life.” But Jasmine’s schoolteacher, Masterji, intervenes. He persuades Pitaji,
her father, of the idea that “modern ladies go [to] secondary-school and find themselves
positions” (50). Following this meeting, Pitaji makes a pledge: “We let the girl decide”
(51). Otherwise, in all probability, Jasmine would have been married to the widower.
Soon tragedy strikes when Pitaji is gored to death.
Shortly after their father’s death, Jasmine’s brothers quit their study, sell the parental
property, and start a scooter repair shop. One day, they invite Prakash—a colleague from
the engineering college they had attended—to their home. Trusting and naïve, Jasmine
falls in love with Prakash.1 Then these lovers leave the village for a more open city life.
Their joy at this freedom does not last long because a bomb planted by religious
extremists kills Prakash. Widowed and without any prospects, Jasmine is left at the
mercy of her relatives. Her brothers, however, rescue her by allowing her to leave India,
forging travel documents on her behalf, thus setting in motion the next phase of her life.
With her forged passport Jasmine reaches the shores of Florida via Amsterdam.
Impressed by the humanity of Half-Face, a Vietnam veteran, she boards on his trawler
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In Hasnapur, a rural Indian village, Jasmine is known as Jyoti; it is Prakash who gives
her a new name, Jasmine.
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and crosses the Atlantic. She then follows him to a motel, only to realize that she made a
terrible mistake. Half-Face rapes her. Jasmine avenges the disgrace by slaying him and is
eventually rescued by a Lillian Gordon. Jasmine later moves to New York, but her life
takes an unusual turn when she encounters Sukhwinder Singh, the murderer of her
husband. Fearing for her life, Jasmine flees to Iowa. The novel ends with Jasmine
deserting Bud, her Iowan husband, to start a new life in California.
Although the power Jasmine’s self-determination bestows upon her is not enough to
fight against the tyranny of her existentiality, existing scholarship depicts her as the sole
maker of her destiny. Jill Roberts, for instance, argues that “Jasmine . . . seeks
empowerment in disconnectedness” (87). Roberts continues, her “potential for being”
involves departure and disconnection (93). If anything, Jasmine suffers more when
existing connections are dissolved until she forms new ones. Timothy Ruppel argues that
Jasmine’s survival rests on her ability to “negotiate and resituate, continually, the horizon
of her fears and desires” (187). Ruppel sees self-reinvention “a million times” as a
weapon for authenticity, but when dislocated, coming into relationships facilitates the
process of “adjustment.” According to Parvinder Mehta:
Jasmine deals with a story of a young, naïve Indian widow whose illegal entry
to America reveals the hidden dangers faced by immigrant women and how
she must shed her past and old selves and learn to transform herself to be able
to survive in America. . . . She has lived in Punjab, India, New York, Iowa, and
in the end leaves for California. She makes her own destiny. (1544)
For Carmen Wickramagamage, the source of Jasmine’s authentic selfhood lies in her
ability to “occupy new subject-positions and to redefine old ones because she realizes
that culture is man-made, and cultural identities and norms provisional, because they
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have their provenance in specific sociocultural locations and serve particular functions
within them” (174). These readings grant Jasmine the status of a lone star who worked
out her identity herself without much explaining the much and often crucial support she
receives from others. In fact, others help in her fight against the terror of her existential
reality and give significance to her existence.
Jasmine is no self-creation. The sources of her authenticity lie in the many
relationships she enters into that not only instill trust in her own abilities but also foster
feelings of autonomy. It is under the auspices of others’ generosity and concern that it
becomes possible for her to pursue her freedom. Her husband Prakash, for example,
invests his mind and heart in modernizing her. A man with egalitarian sensibilities, he
takes her away from the village to the city because he “wanted to break down the Jyoti
I’d been in Hasnapur and make me a new kind of city woman” (76). Jasmine praises
Prakash as a “modern man [who] did trash some traditions” because he believed in
individual autonomy and freedom of choice (76). While daughters were considered a
burden in India because “dowry beggared the families for generations,” their marriage
was based on affection for each other (Michaels 39). In a society where men marry for
dowry and “a wife is killed by her husband or his family [if] her dowry is too small, so
that he can remarry and collect a new dowry” (129), Prakash, a man without greed, has
insisted on a dowryless marriage. Jasmine tells us that hers “was a no-dowry, no-guests
Registry Office wedding” (75). What marital relations mean to Prakash is reciprocal love
and the dignity of both husband and wife. How much he cared about Jasmine and her
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thoughts and feelings is evident in her appraisal of him: “He was a faithful husband [and]
he loved [me]” (92).
A fervent reformer, Prakash initiates Jasmine into the idea that “only in feudal
societies is the woman still vassal” (77). Knowing that Hasnapur is “feudal,” he urges her
not to submit to patriarchal rule. While in Hindu culture, men barely show any concern
for the opinions of their wives in matters that concern the family, for to do so is
considered unbecoming for a man, Prakash turns to Jasmine for guidance and, without
any hesitation, he pleads, “Jasmine . . . help me be a better person” (79). In the
Brahmanic cultural context, what Prakash asks is rebellious. It not only stresses the
equality of the sexes but also sheds light on his reverential nature: “‘The important thing,’
[he] said, ‘was to keep arguing, fight him if I didn’t agree’” (78). A man who disapproves
of female subjugation and wants Jasmine to speak her mind and for herself, he was a
“disrupter and a rebuilder” (77). A man who has a reverence for learning, Prakash also
works very hard to teach Jasmine basic mathematical skills: “What’s ten divided by
two?”
If women are powerless in Hindu culture, it is because they are indoctrinated with
the idea of loyalty and that they worship their husbands as gods. The ordinance of The
Laws of Manu is such that “though destitute of virtue, or seeking pleasure elsewhere, or
devoid of good qualities, (yet) a husband must be constantly worshipped as a god by a
faithful wife” (Radhakrishnan and Moore 191).2 Women are taught to believe that they
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The Laws of Manu, also known as Dharma-shasthra or Manu-smriti, consists of twelve
chapters and 2,684 verses and is thought to have been written during 200 BCE and 200
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have no right to fully express their minds and that their main task is to be devoted to their
husbands. Growing up, she could not escape the influence of patriarchal standards of
female subordination. When Prakash “talk[s] of us being equal,” it panics her (82).
Jasmine finds it difficult to reconcile what he says with what she has seen and been
taught by her parents. The discrepancy between Prakash’s railing against male privilege
and what she has learned about men begets a growing ambivalence in Jasmine, reflected
in her frustration. In essence, Prakash encourages Jasmine to see herself as equal, which
reinforces a new sense of being and helps intensify her sense of independence.
While Prakash speaks against a patriarchy that perpetuates the status quo, creates
an optimal relational context, and stands for sexual equality, Ruppel writes, “Prakash
exerts a more subtle form of patriarchal control, disguised as benevolence and demanding
her active complicity” (184). Ruppel is skeptical about Prakash’s true intentions and
reads his magnanimous nature as a façade worn to hide his sexist nature. Ruppel portrays
Prakash as a patriarch on the basis of his belief that “the husband must protect the wife
whenever he can” (82). While such interpretation may best fit with Western gender
discourse, it would be unjust to read what Prakash says outside the Hindu cultural context
and more unjust to misread his good intentions. To anyone who has not grown up in
Hindu culture, the idea of “protection” may sound sexist. But, in the Brahmanic view, a
devoted husband is the one who bears dharma in his soul, which is to stand up, at the risk
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  

CE by Manu, the first king of medieval India. The book is a collection of sacred laws and
customs of Hinduism that range from the duties of Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vaisya, and
Sudra, rituals, initiation and the study of Vedas, marriage, hospitality, obsequies, dietary
restrictions, pollutions, means of purification, the conduct of women and wives, and the
law of kings as well as matters of juridical interest (“Manu-smriti”).
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of his own life, in protection of his wife and children.3 Prakash, for whom self-sacrifice
serves as a deep moral anchor, dies shielding Jasmine from a bomb attack: “My
husband’s body cushions me” (94). It would be unjust to say that with his rhetoric of
benevolence Prakash robs Jasmine of freedom and authenticity. A person who speaks
against female oppression, Prakash seeks to liberate Jasmine from conventional thinking
and tells her to “stop regressing into the feudal Jyoti. ‘You are Jasmine now”’ (92).
Prakash wants her to be assertive and independent instead of naïve and dependent.
After their first year of marriage, Jasmine tells Prakash, “I wanted to get pregnant”
(77). Part of the reason that Jasmine prefers motherhood is that in the Hindu cultural
tradition, “If marriage is childless, the man can take another wife” (Michaels 113). It
makes sense why Jasmine wants to become a mother. Additionally she is under peer
pressure: “I felt eclipsed by the Mazbi maid’s daughter, who had been married off at
eleven, just after me, and already had had a miscarriage” (78). Prakash, however, is well
aware that “he was too poor to start a family and I was too young. My kind of feudal
compliance was what still kept India an unhealthy and backward nation” (77). This view
goes against the “Brahmanic ritualistic idea of marriage [which] is essentially [for]
control of reproduction. It is considered ‘abortion’ if one does not have sexual relations
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Prakash’s idea of protection gains its significance if we explain it in the context of
Hinduism, particularly the Hindu notion of dharma, which in English translates as moral
obligation. A bearer of dharma “never commits an injustice out of desire or under the
influence of impetuosity, out of fear or to promote his own interests” (Zaehner 119).
From a Brahmanic Hindu perspective, the dharma of a husband is nothing other than
guarding his wife and children against harm. The idea of “protection” thus does not imply
authority but demonstrates selflessness as well as the self-immolating nature of Prakash,
who not only has dharma in his soul but is guided by it. A self-sacrificing man, he dies
protecting Jasmine from the bomb thrown at her.	
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with one’s wife when she is likely to conceive or when the wife prevents sexual
intercourse” (Michaels 120-21).4
In Hindu culture, in the early years of marriage husband and wife “cautiously get
close to one another” (Michaels 126). In the Brahmanic ideal of a husband-wife
relationship, it is considered disrespectful to call husbands by their names, but Prakash
asks Jasmine to “call him by his first name” from the first days of marriage (77). Such an
attitude conveys and the level of freedom it grants to Jasmine is tremendous and even
upsetting to Jasmine. Her conflicted response demonstrates her uncertainty: “Prakash. I
had to practice and practice (in the bathroom, in the tarped-over corner of the verandah
which was our kitchen) so I could say the name without gagging and blushing in front of
his friends.” Jasmine cannot bring herself to express what Prakash advises, which
illustrates the response of a Hindu bride. After all, a daughter in a Hindu family, she had
seen women treated poorly by men throughout her life.
Prakash was weary of people with a feudal mindset. He decides to go to the United
States to study and plans to run a business after his return home to India. Just as he begins
to envision such a dream for the future, fate intervenes. Prakash and his wife become
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  Prakash respects Jasmine and encourages her to fight against gender discrimination. If
he were to adhere to patriarchal norms, he would foreclose her ability to project her being
and be. Jean Miller points out, “Once any group of people has a socially defined role as
dominant and another as subordinate, there cannot be a full relational context” (10).
Prakash never defines his relationship with Jasmine in terms of the position and privilege
of a Hindu husband. He grants her control over her own life and provides a full relational
context.
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targets of the Khalsa Lions, a group fighting for a “sovereign state.”5 Firm believers in
theology, the Khalsa Lions see Sikhism as the only sensible religion. They hold a view
that the impure must either renounce all filth and idolatry or be prepared for their own
demise (65). With the stress on the spiritual purity of every person, the Khalsa Lions
force people to stop eating meat, smoking tobacco, and drinking alcohol. They
commanded all men to grow beards and “wear a turban” and all women look after their
fathers and husbands in humble submission. Among these adherents, Sukhwinder Singh
believes that “True Pakistanis are Punjabis, like us. . . . Pakistanis were Hindu who saw
the light of the true God and converted. So were Sikhs.6 Only blood sucker banyas and
untouchable monkeys remained Hindu” (66). Fixated on questions of virtue and honor, he
believes that if people live in strict accordance with the principles of Sikhism, they
escape the darkness of their lives. In his eyes, all Hindu men are rapists, all Hindu women
whores, and their “sari is the sign of the prostitute” (65).
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According to Jasmine, “Khalsa means pure. Lions of Purity. The gang dressed in white
shirts and pajamas and indigo turbans, and all of them toted heavy kirpans on bandoliers”
(49).
	
  
6
In order to make sense of Sukhwinder’s religious fundamentalism, it is important here
to refer to India’s violent past, particularly, Sikh war for Khalistan (free state) of the
1970s and the Hindi-Sikh acrimony. In particular, it is necessary to recall Jarnail Singh
Bhindranwala, Sikh guru, who preached and promoted radical Sikhism and led a protest
to stop Sant Nirankaris ridiculing Sikh practices and parodying of Gurus (Bhindranwale
i-vi). An advocate of Khalistan and a visionary of radical Sikh identity, Bhindranwala
asked all men to make a “pledge by raising your arms. I ask those brothers who have
destroyed their hair and beards and, having fallen into false and bad company, have
strayed away from Sikh ways . . . . If you [are] Sikhs of Siri Guru Sahib and not of some
holy man or other person, . . . then those of you who have cut their hair and beards should
promise that in the future you will not cut your hair and beards and that you will not take
alcohol” (41). Initiated into such rhetoric, Hindus, Sukhwinder Singh believes, were the
true enemies “bent on genocide of the Sikh nation.”	
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Steadfast to Sikh codes of faith and purity, Sukhwinder finds Jasmine’s falling in
love with Prakash a deviation from the traditional gender roles. It outrages him. Hurt, he
warns Arvind-prar, Jasmine’s brother, to keep his “whorish women off the streets” (65).
But Arvind-prar ignores the threat, thus fueling Sukhwinder’s anger. Insulted by Arvindprar’s unbending nature, Sukhwinder plants a bomb to kill Jasmine, but it takes Prakash’s
life. Widowed at a young age and bound by Hindu customs, she “wanted to scream,
‘Feudalism!’” When he is dying, Prakash asks for a pledge: “Think Vijh and Wife! . . .
There is no dying. There is only an ascending or descending, moving on to other planes”
(96). Prakash’s dying request keeps something alive in Jasmine, which is the ideal life he
has imagined. And his plea, which seeks to regain the dream lost, both begets a new
reality for Jasmine and also exerts a moral obligation for fulfilling the mission. Jasmine
knows that “Prakash had taken Jyoti and created Jasmine, and Jasmine would complete
the mission of Prakash. Vijh and Wife.” To keep his dream alive is a “matter of duty and
honor” (97). It was, however, Prakash who had an American visa, and it is not until her
brothers arrange her “illegal documents” (98) that she can begin her journey. According
to Jasmine, it took her brothers “months, many trips to Chandigarh and Delhi, and cost
me everything Prakash had saved. My passport name, officially, was Jyoti Vijh. My date
of birth made me safely nineteen years old. ‘Otherwise, problems,’ said the travel
advisers” (99). There is very little Jasmine could do individually if it were not her
brothers who forged travel documents on her behalf. The opportunity to leave India and
to be at liberty is a significant step toward building an authentic self as yet to be born.
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If her brothers had followed the dictates of Hindu theology, Jasmine could never
have escaped the clutches of patriarchy and be a world traveler: she would remain a
widow forever. The Laws of Manu state that woman “must not seek to separate herself
from her father, husband, or sons; by leaving them she would make both (her own and
her husband’s) families contemptible” (Radhakrishnan and Moore 191). In Brahmanic
tradition, “physically, the widow lives on, but ritually and socially, she dies with the
husband.” The constraints of Hindu ethical codes are such that, “after the demise of her
husband, a widow cannot and should not leave home” (Michaels 152). The widow eats
certain foods and refrains from intermingling with others to retain her purity. Jasmine’s
duty, as Hindu religion demands it, is to honor her dead husband by remaining a widow
forever, abstaining from sexual relations, and taking care of her aging in-laws.
Within Hindu religious and cultural contexts, leaving India is tantamount to an
insult to her in-laws as well as to the deceased. However, with the help of her brothers
who work on her visa problem, Jasmine arrives in Amsterdam. She then submits an
application for a U.S. visa. When the United States embassy does not grant her one, it
thwarts her attempt to enter into the country, preventing her from fulfilling her mission,
which is to go to the campus where Prakash had planned to study and “to lay out the suit,
to fill it with twigs and papers . . . [and] then to lie upon it in the white cotton sari I had
brought from home” (118). A part of her deceased husband Prakash, Jasmine’s goal was
to show him her devotion by dying on the pyre made of his suit. That is why “‘I had not,’
Jasmine says, ‘given even a day’s survival in America a single thought’” (120). Then,
with the assistance of “a Surinamese Indian,” a railway porter in Amsterdam, (103)
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Jasmine befriends Half-Face, “captain of a trawler,” who smuggles her to the United
States.
When the trawler reaches Florida, the people on board are separated, to be taken
to different destinations. At the time of separation, Kingsland, a Jamaican, gives Jasmine
a small knife as a parting gift, whispering in her ear not to “truss dat mon, no way” (106)
and alerting that she could “count on dat [knife] at least, when de end of de world come
in.” An alien in a foreign land, Jasmine must nevertheless trust Half-Face. Evidently, her
entry into the United States is not a product of luck, even though Anu Aneja, overlooking
the hard facts, writes, “A young village girl who is uprooted from her home in rural India,
[Jasmine] finds herself, by some twist of fortune, on her way to Tampa, Florida” (72).
Suppose it were the case that the brothers did not make arrangements for her US trip, to
the extent of forging visa papers, then Jasmine would not have been able to undertake the
journey in the first place.
In Jasmine’s account, Half-Face “whisk[s] me inland off the keys, deep into pine
and Sabal palm country” (109). He was reassuring: “You need accommodations, we got
accommodations. It’ll cost you but we got them. You need transportation, we’ll truck you
anywhere you want” (106). Impressed by his humanity, Jasmine follows him “off narrow
roads to Flamingo Court” (110), an abandoned motel, where they plan to spend the night.
Jasmine senses her own physical abuse. She tries in vain to convince him that “my
husband was killed . . . Please don’t do anything to me” (115). For all his outward show
of compassion for immigrants, Half-Face is a predator: “He was all hands and face in
motion. I twisted, only delaying the inevitable” (116). The physical contact with Half-

113
Face is despicable as well as disgraceful and is morally injurious, which devastates
Jasmine from within.
Reflecting upon the disgrace, it struck Jasmine that murdering Half-Face would
restore her lost dignity. But first, she sanctifies her body and soul: “I determined to clean
my body as it had never been cleaned, with the small wrapped bar of soap, and to purify
my soul with all the prayers” (117).7 She slices her tongue and returns to the room to find
Half-Face “asleep in his total nakedness” (118). It was an opportune moment to vent her
rage on the sexual predator. Jasmine soon forces the knife into his neck (117). If HalfFace were to wake up, she would be reduced to nothing, but how could it occur to him
that Jasmine could be so brave? Following the murder, Jasmine takes a shower to purify
her body and sings her “prayers for the dead,” then wipes the sink. She then walks out of
the motel.
While the incident reveals Jasmine is brave and can be dangerous, abandoned in a
new existential reality and to her own fate, she wanders the roads with no idea of what is
to become of her. According to her, “I followed a highway headed north . . . [t]hinking I
was among farmers, that I might find food, water, and work [and] that’s all I knew. In
India, I would have come upon at least a village or two, but in Florida there was only the
occasional country store or trailer park. I hadn’t a penny” (128). This state of having no
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To purify her body and redeem it from sin, Jasmine takes multiple baths. According to
Hindu Brahmanic rituals, bathing purifies the body fouled by rape, sin, or sexual
intercourse. Michaels writes, “Brahman . . . always purifies himself ritually in the river
after sexual intercourse” (185).
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direction or of not knowing where to go is an ontological uprootedness. But Lillian
Gordon rescues her:8
She came to me and put her hands on my shoulders. “Child! What is it? You’re
trembling.” She led me to the stairs and sat me down on the middle one. . . . Soon,
a woman appeared with food on a paper plate and a plastic fork. It was the first
hot, prepared food I’d had in over a month. . . . “My name is Lillian Gordon,” she
said. “I won’t ask yours because it’s probably a fake. . . .” Lillian Gordon [then]
took me home with her. (130)
Here, Jasmine is confronted with the fragile and unpredictable nature of her existence,
which slaps in her face. This begs the question of what she would have done if it were not
for Lillian.9 Having left with no options, Jasmine cannot choose her own way or follow
her own path. The likelihood of being arrested by the law enforcement officials and
extradited to her country of origin was terrifying. It is when existential circumstances
bring her to her knees that others become all the more important. Lillian is well aware of
her vulnerability to both sexual predators and to immigration authorities. She takes
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
   	
  
8

Lillian is symbolic of what America stands for as a host nation that provides sanctuary
to those who reach to her shore, escaping hunger, war, violence, and sexual oppression.
Her benevolence towards the illegal immigrants reminds us of Jeremy Rifkin, who in The
Empathic Civilization, writes, “Without empathy it would be impossible to even imagine
a social life and the organization of society. Try to conjure up a society of narcissists,
sociopaths, or autistically challenged individuals. Society requires being social and being
social requires empathic extension” (42).
	
  
9
To explain the significance of Lillian’s initiation of Jasmine into American culture, it is
relevant here to discuss the notion of “spatiality.” In Being and Time, Heidegger writes
that “Dasein itself has a ‘Being-in-space’ of its own” (83). He thus localizes the idea of
space within Dasein itself, not beyond or outside it, and precludes its spatial-temporal
orientation. Commenting upon this, Alejandro Vallega argues that in Heideggerian
formulation, “spatiality does not appear as an issue exterior to the question of being;
spatiality is operative in the disclosedness of events of beings” (114). In focusing on the
temporality of being and in grounding spatiality in the temporality of Dasein, Heidegger
leaves no room for the “pure space,” the space inhabited by the ontic, the body. But, the
manifestation of Dasein is also a spatial event. In any given moment of time, it is
physically located within a space where its unfolding takes place.	
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Jasmine to her home and provides her shelter. Of course, Jasmine is not free to choose the
course of her destiny nor can she mislead herself into thinking about self-reliance. She is
close to starvation: “I hadn’t eaten in two days” (128). Jasmine does not tell “Mrs.
Gordon what she’d rescued me from” (131). Lillian’s heart gives Jasmine a reason to
hope that she is not alone in her fight against the tyranny of her existential uncertainty.
It is worth asking here how Jasmine would have prevailed if it were not for others.
For all her resolute will, Jasmine is not an end in herself. More than providing food and
shelter, in fear that officials from the “INS [may] leap at the sight of you in those
sandals,” Lillian gives Jasmine her daughter Kate’s clothes. She is aware that “shoes are
the biggest giveaway. Undocumented aliens wear boxy shoes with ambitious heels”
(130). Thrown into a new existential context Jasmine finds herself in, there is little she
can do personally. In this new existential reality, her behavior seems foreign. Jasmine
must hide her otherness, which is visible in her Indian attire, if she wants to decrease the
likelihood of deportation. In order to make her existence possible, Lillian gives her a
Jazzy T-shirt, tight cords, and running shoes. The American clothes disguise her
widowhood: “In T-shirt and cords, I was taken for a student” (145).
Jasmine has to assume an identity more appropriate to the reality she is in so that she
can become intelligible as Dasein. We can see why Lillian advises her to learn
“American talk and walk” (133). Lillian next takes her to a nearby shopping mall to teach
her about the American ways. When she feels uneasy on the elevator, which she had
never seen before, Lillian advises her to show confidence. If Jasmine were to escape
suspicion of those who “pick up dark people like [her] who’re afraid to get on or off” and
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thus deportation, she must learn norms and practices appropriate to the new existential
context. Otherwise, she would fall into the hands of an INS officer or into a debilitating
struggle for basic survival or forced to make her living either as “a picker or a domestic”
(134). Lillian, whose sympathy lies with the illegals, familiarizes Jasmine with ways that
grant her power, elevating her beyond the finitude of her existence.
Jasmine’s reliance on others is not limited to her brothers and Lillian Gordon. After
her recovery in body and spirit, she moves to Flushing, New York, to join the Vadheras.
Jasmine says to Lillian, “‘I want to go to New York. I have an address there.’ I showed
her the back of Professor Devinder Vadhera’s aerogram’” (134). Back in India, Vadhera
was Prakash’s teacher. He was more than a teacher, a “friend,” who had helped Prakash
financially so that he could stay in school (139). Jasmine wants to join them because Mr.
Vadhera is her husband’s teacher and, perhaps even more so, because of her helpless
status. She is hopeful that he has not forgotten the widow of his student, Prakash. At the
time of departure, Lillian advises her to “walk and talk American, they’ll think you were
born here. Most Americans can’t imagine anything else” (135). As a parting gift, she
gives Jasmine one hundred dollars in cash and writes her daughter Kate’s “Manhattan
address.” In case Jasmine “get[s] picked up at Port Authority” in New York, with Kate’s
assistance she could hire a lawyer. The risk Lillian takes for her is evident in her arrest
for harboring illegals. Even after incarceration, Lillian made sure that Jasmine’s “name
and address never appeared in her files” (137). In refusing to give government officials
the names and addresses of illegal immigrants, Lillian denies telling the truth, but she
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creates for the aliens an opportunity for being. Doing otherwise would amount to denying
them an existential context for their being.
The change of location has ontic significance. When Jasmine chooses to join the
Vadheras, her decision has been made for her by her existential spatiality, for the dread of
what would happen next if she were not to find an emotional anchor forces her to enter
into relationships. When Jasmine hires a taxi in New York, she fears that she may not
have enough money for the fare. But, when she recalls that the Vadheras, who are good
people, she feels certain that “if I run short . . . Professorji will take care of it” (139). An
Indian enclave, a community of Indian people who had “kept a certain kind of Punjab
alive, even if that Punjab no longer existed” (162), in Flushing Jasmine feels secure.
Professorji had recently married Nirmala, a nineteen-year girl from India who rents Hindi
movies and brings Jasmine “plain saris and salwar-kameez outfits.” It is easy for Jasmine
to get along. In addition, Prof. Vadhera introduces her to the Indian community as his
own relative so that people would not suspect her illegal status. What Jasmine says about
the Vadheras is relevant here: “Professorji and his family put me up for five months—and
it could have been five years, given the elasticity of the Indian family—just because I was
the helpless widow of his favorite student” (142).
Just as Lillian, the Vadheras are generous and hospitable. Like Lillian, they provide
Jasmine sanctuary and teach her “a great deal about surviving as an Indian in New York”
(162). Jasmine recognizes the dreadful condition in which she exists so much so that she
didn’t “feel safe going outdoors. If I had a green card, a job, a goal, happiness would
appear out of the blue” (149). To be illegal in the country is to live with a dread of being
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detained and deported at any time. When Jasmine begins to delve into the fate that will
befall on her, it begets dread.10 She is not an agent of choice but a “prisoner without a
green card.” When the fear grows bigger, she dreads going outside, thus becoming a
prisoner of her own house. What is existentially important is her mental status—the dread
of capture and deportation. Out of desperation, she turns to Professorji. In her words, “I
told him I wanted a green card more than anything else in the world, that a green card
was freedom.” While her pursuit of a green card is unlawful, the constant awareness of
being illegal occupies her mind, begetting a tyranny of being caught and deported. Her
husband’s connection with Professorji bears fruit when she wins his sympathy. The card
will cost three thousand dollars, an amount that Jasmine cannot afford. But, to her relief,
Professorji is willing to loan the money.
With the card, Jasmine can be herself. While she cannot work without proper papers
and is confined at home, she calls Kate to see if she can get a job. They soon become
friends. Through her connection with Kate, Jasmine gets acquainted with Taylor Hayes, a
physics professor at Columbia University, and his wife Wylie Hayes, a writer and an
editor for a publisher on Park Avenue (169). The Hayeses hire her for $95 a week as a
caregiver. Jasmine has to look after their little girl, Duff, whom they have adopted. When
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To	
  Heidegger angst has an existential significance: “Anxiety throws Dasein back upon
that which it is anxious about—its authentic potentiality-for-Being-in-the-the world”
(232). Angst brings Dasein to its own home by alienating and freeing it from being
absorbed into the world. Heidegger says that “anxiety brings [Dasein] back from its
absorption in the ‘world.’ Everyday familiarity collapses” (233). Jasmine’s current state
of being is an existential condition, a wandering away from her authentic ontology. For
Heidegger, anxiety may call Dasein out of its everyday oblivion to its authentic form of
being, but for me, angst confiscates the ability to unfold in the world. In dread, Jasmine is
not-at-home. 	
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the Hayeses hire Jasmine they do not even ask for references because “Kate’s already
told us something about you . . . . You will be part of the family” (167). Later, with their
support Jasmine gets a part-time job in Columbia’s Mathematics Department answering
phones. In what is perhaps the most significant turn of events, Jasmine secures a job at
the Indian Language Department “as a Punjabi reader . . . . [T]hey asked if I wanted to
teach a beginning section someday, or tutor some graduate students.”
I am developing this reading in opposition to a notion that authentic identity is a
personal state of affairs where a self becomes a resource for its authenticity, charts its
own life course, and makes its own destiny with little account of others who protect its
interest and serve as its “ontological foothold” (Being 85). For all of her courage, it is not
within Jasmine’s ability to fight against the forces that determine her fate when she enters
into a new existential context. In New York, just as Prakash, her brothers, Lillian, and the
Vadheras have, the Taylors offer her refuge, provide her guidance, and give her hope.
Jasmine attains a sense of direction and financial independence. She pays her debt to
“Professorji in a single check” (180). In the second year of Jasmine’s stay with the
Hayeses, “Wylie fell out of love with Taylor and into love with . . . Stuart Eschelman”
because she notices the growing intimacy between Jasmine and her husband (181).
Realizing that Taylor loves Jasmine, Wylie walks out on him. Jasmine too had an inkling
that “Taylor was very fond of me. Even a little bit in love with me” (183). With Wylie
gone, Jasmine “was eager to lavish care on my perfect family.” In her own terms, “We
were happy, happier than when Wylie’d been around filling up the apartment with her
restlessness. . . . Now the rooms seemed warmed by a mute intimacy” (184).
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For Jasmine, “life had a new fullness and chargedness to it.” She had enjoyed
related autonomy. But her newfound happiness is short-lived. Her life takes a major turn
when she encounters the murderer of her husband, Sukhwinder Sing. As it turns out, he is
in the United States. The terror of seeing him is so great that Jasmine “wanted to talk, but
my throat had sealed. I couldn’t get my breath, it was like asthma” (188). Sukhwinder
Singh’s presence changes her life because he knows that she is here illegally (189). The
sobering fact that she is illegal occupies her consciousness and gives her nightmares of
deportation. From an existential perspective, the fear is a dread that forces her to leave
New York. Jasmine flees to Baden, Iowa, with a hope that “miracles still happened”
(197). I must mention that the choice she makes is a necessity forced by her existential
spatiality, but not her own. Moreover, to run away from New York to Iowa believing in
miracles is to be aware of life circumstances that do not offer any choices.
Once in Iowa, Jasmine escapes the threat Sukhwinder poses. But, having been
thrown into a new existential context, there is little she can do to alter her fate and be her
own self. According to her, “I was desperate and I didn’t know anyone in Iowa” (196).
Against the limits placed by her existential reality, Jasmine loses her sense of direction.
Dispirited, she finds herself at the personnel office of the University Hospital “begging a
potato-faced women behind the widest, cleanest counter for a job, any job (telling her that
I would do whatever needed doing).” It is at this moment that Mother Ripplemeyer
comes to her to take her home for lunch. Jasmine recalls, “The first time she met me, she
asked if I was good with numbers. Passably, I said” (35). Mother guesses that Jasmine is
“a student at the university [and] I didn’t disabuse her.” Jasmine must have feared her
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downfall before she would assume the identity of a scholar and pretend that she is in the
United States to study.
Later, Mother Ripplemeyer introduces Jasmine to her son, Bud, a banker. He finds
himself very much drawn to her: “Who have you brought us, a maharani? I hope you
haven’t eaten, Your Highness, because I’m just headed out the door” (35). Bud is a good
and warm-hearted man who falls in love at first sight. Again, Jasmine is rescued by
another stranger, Mother Ripplemeyer, who frees her from inauthentic possibilities and
prevents her hope for freedom from fading. Without others to rely on, neither could
Jasmine deal with her present situation nor be able to create a context that’d prepare a
way for her understanding of herself and the world. Soon, Bud steps out of marriage to
live with an “Indian woman” (14). Within a year, they adopt Du, a fourteen-year-old
orphan whose “mother and brother were hacked to death” in Vietnam (18). Du had
escaped the brutality of a refugee camp. It is soul satisfying for Jasmine to have a son like
Du. According to her, “We’ve survived hideous times” (214). A teenage boy who “has
lived through five or six languages, five or six countries, two or three centuries of
history,” Du represents who she is (214). We are told that his behavior and technical
skills closely echo those of Prakash. Jasmine describes him as “an inventor, a little like
Prakash, exceptional and impatient. . . . Like Prakash, he has a surgeon’s touch. He
transforms the crude appliances that he touches” (29, 154). A man for whom “Baden was
death until [Jasmine] came,” Bud gives her his heart and protects her from uncertainty
(200). With Bud as a loving partner, life for Jasmine becomes bearable and her future
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stable. Her coming across Mother and then Bud thus takes on greater existential
significance.
But a disillusioned farmer, Harlan Kroener, shoots Bud before he blows “his own
head off” (199). Bud survives the gunshot but is left paralyzed. Jasmine, who has
idealized Bud as “a secular god of Baden,” was not aware of him hurting anybody (200).
This is why when Harlan came with a gun he “didn’t register on me as a disturbed and
violent farmer who saw himself betrayed by his banker” (192). The tragedy turns a oncehappy life into one of agony. Bud will never become a “whole man” (36). “What kills me
in this half-lit bedroom,” Jasmine says, “is the look of torture, excitement, desperation on
Bud’s face as he watches me.” Her despair is amplified when Du declares that he is going
to California to be with his sister. Jasmine feels unsettled. A part of her being, the
“prospect of losing him [was] like a miscarriage” (221). Jasmine’s whole life was in his:
“I had relied on him, my silent ally against the bright lights, the rounded, genial
landscape of Iowa [and h]is wirings and circuits were as close to Vijh & Vijh as I would
ever get” (221-23). Jasmine, who lacks protection against the dread of loneliness, pleads
with him to stay until high school, but to no avail. After a moment of contemplation,
Jasmine acknowledges why he should join his “married sister who fed him live worms
and lizards in the detention camp” (221).
While Jasmine is full of courage and spirit, others are, more often than not, if not
the architects of her destiny, the protectors of her interest. When the weight of her
existential reality is too great for her to withstand, family, friends, and acquaintances
support her. Relations as constitutive of her ability to act is evident, among other places,
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in the final episode where Taylor and Duff arrive in Iowa from New York to ask her to
join them in their journey west. Initially, Jasmine contemplates the moral cost of her
desertion of Bud the banker and her fiancé: “I can’t leave. How can I? I want to do the
right thing. I don’t mean to be a terrible person”(239). Bud needs care. But, “‘Why not,
Jase?’ Taylor says, ‘It’s a free country.’” What Taylor says provokes thinking. Jasmine
realizes, “I am not choosing between men. I am caught between the promise of America
and old-world dutifulness” (240). As Jasmine reflects upon the choices between the
dutiful Hindu wife and freedom, it dawns on her that she must sacrifice her principles of
devotion. Jasmine decides to leave Iowa, leaving behind the traditional Hindu feminine
virtue of submission and sacrifice.
As her life trajectory demonstrates, the basic existential state for Jasmine is not
autonomy and individual identity but being a part of a web of relationships. Her identity
is continually negotiated in terms of the existential reality she finds herself in and her
thoughts and actions are determined by causes outside her control. If anything, when
existing connections are dissolved, her existential reality renders her effort to apprehend
reality difficult and frustrating until she forms new ones. Jasmine is always in the
ontological field of others, which suggests that freedom and a sense of worth are not
intrinsic to her but always implicate others. When Jasmine feels desolate, most deeply
vulnerable at a time when her existential reality dictates her choice, others enable her to
come to grips with her situation. Others are her destiny. As determined as she is, when
faced with her existential reality, she takes refuge in relationships.
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Like Morrison, Kingston, Cisneros, and Silko, Mukherjee defines individual growth
in dialogue with, though sometimes in struggle against, others who serve as the
ontological bases of the self. Her emphasis on relationships as a foundation for the
constitution of a self’s being calls into question the Heideggerian view that “Dasein, as
Being-in-the-world, is as it is. The state of Being does not arise just because some other
entity is present-at-hand outside of Dasein and meets up with it” (84). Heidegger exalts
the self itself as a defining aspect of authenticity, but Jasmine’s story provides useful
insights into why individual will or actions alone cannot be sufficient grounds for an
authentic selfhood. What she says, “fates are so intertwined in the modern world,”
stresses the true significance of relationships (Jasmine 15). If Jasmine cannot stand by
herself outside of the “they” and if the virtue of her courage is not enough to initiate her
into her a more authentic form of existence, she is certainly different from them, but is
always ontologically inseparable.

EPILOGUE
Humans exist in the state of the “We.” . . . [But t]he West simply
seeks to deny this fact about human existence. The I-society
imagines the construction of a massive singular, “monocultural,”
society made up of only Is each pursuing their own
individualistic interests in “healthy” competition with all of the
other Is. Carved, as if in stone, on the inside of the foreheads of
Western peoples, I imagine the words, “Each man acts so as to
enhance his own self interest.” Carved inside my own forehead
are two simple letters W and E. [T]he I-society prefers to picture
itself as the captain in the single ship superior to and
disconnected from all other things. . . . The greatest advance that
could be made in ethical systems in the West would be a
recognition of the We-factor.
--V. F. Cordova

In their reflection on human existence, many philosophers envision authentic
existence in the context of the individual situation without giving much credit to others as
an ontological necessity. However, contemporary thinkers and theorists of the self such
as Charles Taylor, Kenneth J. Gergen, and Robert Bellah theorize selfhood in the context
of close relationships while showing the problems inherent in existential conception of an
authentic individuality. Drawing from Eastern and Western philosophy, neuroscience and
social psychology, in this dissertation I have shown that Toni Morrison, Bharati
Mukherjee, Sandra Cisneros, Leslie Marmon Silko, and Maxine Hong Kingston write
against the ethos of individualism in their conceptualization of the self in terms of factual
existence and in imagining authentic existence in terms of the community of which the
self is a part. As they see it, in their most existential configurations the self and others are
ontologically interrelated.
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In The Bluest Eye Morrison demonstrates the existential value of concrete and
particular circumstances of daily life in the constitution of an authentic self in her
portrayal of Pecola Breedlove, who is destroyed by the emotional effects of isolation and
a diminished sense of being born of the inculcation of dominant ideals of beauty that
uglify her. Bereft of love, starved for intimacy, and being deceived about herself, she falls
into insanity. Her estrangement from her true self shows that each individual stands as
what it is only in relation to others whose attitude and behaviors have a strong
psychological bearing on it, particularly, the development of its authentic ontology.
Likewise, in Ceremony, Silko advances the idea that individual identity is
inseparable from others in her fictional account of Tayo. Like Pecola, he lacks parental
love and suffers neglect and racial stereotyping. Worse still, war experiences torment him
and lead to a state where his sense of being there, of a self that is, is lost. But, while
Pecola is destroyed in absence of an ontological anchor, when others accept him as who
he is and provide reassurance of his love and compassion, which restore his dignity, Tayo
becomes aware of who he is and where he stands. This growing awareness gradually
helps clear the confusion of his mind created by painful memories. With love and
growing calmness of mind, he defeats hurtful feelings and thoughts that shield him from
truth. The weight of the past begins to lift and life becomes worth living. If others were
not there to help him in his efforts at recovering his sense of being, it would not be easy
for Tayo to pull out of emotional delusion mending his broken self together towards
coherence.
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In Warrior and Mango Street, Kingston and Cisneros provide similar accounts of
self-development. A person who is reared in an interdependent ethical system, in
Warrior, when Moon Orchid fails to establish intimate interpersonal relationships, she
not only loses her authentic self but also fails to survive. Thrown into an isolating world
and left with relatives whose “vast . . . existence of life is narrowed to “little ‘me,’” she
feels lonely and miserable (Krishnamurti 86). Moon Orchid tries to awake her nieces and
nephews from apathy, but they do not show any sensitivity to her need for love, which
leaves her with the dread of being abandoned. She becomes deluded, which robs her of
sanity, a phenomenon reminiscent of Pecola in Bluest. In contrast, through writing herself
into relationship about her aunts, mother, and mythical warriors, Maxine rises towards
authenticity.
What holds true for Maxine holds true for Esperanza in Mango. Like Maxine,
Esperanza finds fulfillment in relationships. She too channels her intellectual energy into
communal well-being, which is collecting stories of people of her community. Just as
Maxine becomes intelligible as Dasein in giving her heart to writing about her aunts,
mother, and mythical warriors, which is fulfilling because it gives her a perspective and
shapes her vision, imagining her community into language and building a just society are
constitutive of Esperanza’s self. In their desire for self-actualization, Esperanza and
Maxine observe, if not experience, the lives lived by others and bring their personal
experiences into perspective. Their morality is based on the ethics of care or duty to
others who are indispensible in shaping their authentic ontology. While others function as
sources and inspiration for them, their vocation is to bring the silence of people of their
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community into the iconography of language. Mukherjee shows even more poignantly
what is involved in one’s way to individuation in her fictional representation of the titular
character in Jasmine, who collapses under the weight of existential uncertainty unless
others reach out, affirm her hope, and empower her self-determination. When faced with
life uncertainties, she overcomes her dread of an uncertain future, adopts easily into new
life, and her struggle for self-realization remains secure when intimate and trusting
relationships supply her a sense of being.
Multiethnic depiction of individuals who are doomed in absence of intimate
relationships is reminiscent of Robert Bellah et al. who find it hard to conceptualize the
self in all its pristine purity, disconnected from authority, cultural tradition, and social
institutions (81). Likewise, multiethnic reflections on individual identity as emerging
from the relational world one inhabits and shares with others recall Karl Jaspers, who
claims that “the individual cannot become human himself. Self-being is only real in
communication with another self-being. Alone, I sink into gloomy isolation—only in
community with others can I be revealed in the act of mutual discovery” (174). In the
case of Pecola and Moon Orchid, for example, when faced with apathy and left to
themselves, they fail to grapple with their existential reality. Eventually, they sink into
insanity. Their fate indicates that the individual alone is not determinative of what it is
and what it will become. Through their fictions, multiethnic writers thus question the
cardinal virtue of the self-made individual of the West and speak against the “cult of the
sovereign and . . . lonely genius” (Siegel 4) while simultaneously critiquing the cultural
paradigm that encourages individuals to “take refuge in,” to use McLaren’s terms, “the
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forms of subjectivity increasingly experienced as isolated and separate from larger social
contexts” (45). In addition, they recover the significance of others as an ontological
necessity, while providing the relational self as a moral alternative to the individualistic
ethical paradigm of the West.
Given their range and diversity, it is not possible to provide a more comprehensive
picture of multiethnic reflections on existential issues. This study is meant to enrich our
understanding of multiethnic fictions and to show that reading them within an
individualistic framework is at odds with their concern with existential issues. I have
combined existential philosophy, theories of the self, and neuroscience in this study to
show how the self and others are implicated in each other’s authentic existence.
Promising future work could be the application of the framework developed in this
dissertation to read works such as The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, The Great
Gatsby, Sister Carrie, The Sun Also Rises, and Native Son. Examining them from an
existential-humanistic perspective is essential in that at a time when individualistic
discourse dominated the narratives of the nation, these works question individualistic
ethos by representing characters whose lives seem wasted, lost, or unfulfilled in the
absence of meaningful relationships. Although this study is limited to five writers who
belong to four ethnic groups, I hope to have shown that the multiethnic view of the self is
much more comprehensive than an individualistic account of it in its depiction of the self
and others as being existential bases for each other, together establishing the
meaningfulness of the world within which to shape each other’s destiny and to live
authentically.
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